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African Perspectives on China-Africa Links

Author(s): Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong

Source: The China Quarterly , Sep., 2009, No. 199, China and Africa: Emerging Patterns in Globalization and Development (Sep., 2009), pp. 728-759

Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the School of Oriental and African Studies

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African Perspectives on China-Africa Links Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong*

ABSTRACT Scholars and the international media often allude to a puta tive "African view" of Africa-China links, constructed from anecdotal evi

dence. Using random sample and university-based surveys, we elaborate the first empirically based study of what Africans think of their relationships with China. We reach three conclusions. First, African views are not nearly

as negative as Western media make out, but are variegated and complex. Second, the survey results are at variance with the dominant Western media representation that only African ruling elites are positive about these links. Third, we find that the dominant variation in African perspec

tives is by country, compared with variations such as age, education and gender. The differences among countries in attitudes towards China are pri

marily a function of the extent to which national politicians have elected to raise the "Chinese problem" and, secondarily, the extent of Western media influence in African states.

The meteoric growth of China-Africa links in the present decade has led to speculation about what Africans think of relations between their continent and the country which is now the world's largest manufacturer. Links are on many levels, but Africans often speak of trade of primary products for Chinese manu factures, China's building African infrastructure, Chinese migration to Africa, and solidarity on issues involving differences with Western powers. These are also China-Africa connections discussed in Western media, where "anti-China" voices often feature.1 In response, Chinese leaders often avoid

* We consider those who assisted us in survey administration to effectively be our co-authors and thank them for their efforts: Mustafa Abdallah and Ali Abdallah Ali (Sudan), Shorouk Aly (Egypt), Kuruvila Matthews (Ethiopia), Moonga Moomba (Zambia), Stellah Mukhovi (Kenya), Olusheyi Ojekunle (Nigeria), Yoon Jung Park (South Africa), Dzodzi Tsikata (Ghana), Letshwiti Tutwane (Botswana). The Hong Kong Government Research Grants Council generously funded our research (HKUST6422/05H).

1 See, e.g. Ofeibea Quist-Acton, "Army of shopkeepers paved China's way in Africa," National Public Radio (US), 1 August 2008, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=93143915 (Senegalese writer on China's "new form of colonialism"); Craig Trimberg, "In Africa, China's trade brings growth, unease," Washington Post, 13 June 2006 (prominent South Africa businessman: "If the British were our masters yesterday, the Chinese have taken their place").

? The China Quarterly, 2009 doi: 10.1017/S030574100999018X

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African Perspectives on China-Africa Links

discussing many problems of links with Africa,2 although complaints about the quality of some Chinese goods and firms and about some Chinese not wanting to mix with Africans have been acknowledged, as have "issues such as how to

make more ordinary Africans benefit from the country's aid projects, and how to effectively protect the environment, and the interests of the workforce."3

We have elsewhere analysed empirically distinctive aspects of China's links with Africa and the political basis of the Western media's negative portrayal of China-Africa relations.4 Here, we go beyond the discourse of a putative "African view" of China by presenting survey data. These polls – in African states by US-based firms and a Cameroonian researcher and our own survey of some 2,000 African university students and faculty in nine African countries – allow us to consider factors that may account for variation in African perspectives on China-Africa links.

The surveys have limitations. Some random sample polls were done only in a single country; the largest covered a fifth of African states. Ours was carried out only in universities. Despite the apparent limitation in its scope, it does allow us to gauge the thinking of a slice of the intelligentsia and the proto-elites they train and it is also one of the relatively rare examples of cross-national study of African

opinion.5 It also goes well beyond the range of questions asked in other surveys, to include many issues raised in the international China-Africa discourse. We also did surveys in several countries not previously polled, most notably Zambia, a country at the heart of the international discourse.

The surveys allow for three important conclusions about what Africans think of links with China. First, based on all surveys taken together, African views are

not nearly as negative as Western media make out,6 nor as positive as official Chinese sources imply. Instead, our findings show opinions are variegated and complex. Respondents eschew a binary view: if they are basically positive about China-Africa links they still recognize areas of tension; if they are basically negative they regard some aspects as beneficial. Next, the findings of the random

2 "China helps Africa where West failed – State Bank official," Reuters, 18 October 2007; Yuan Wu, China and Africa (Beijing: China Intercontinental Press, 2006).

3 "Zhongguo zai Feizhou xingxiang diaocha" ("Survey of China's image in Africa"), Xinhuawang, 6 November 2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/heralo72006-ll/06/content_5294430.htm; "Sino-African ties seen in the right perspective," China Daily, 10 August 2008.

4 Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong, "Friends and interests: China's distinctive links with Africa," African Studies Review, Vol. 50, No. 3 (2007), pp. 75-114; and "Forest for the trees: trade, investment and the China-in-Africa discourse," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 1 (2008), pp. 9-29.

5 Similarly, a survey among university students in Nigeria that found that between 1973 and 1995 popular priorities had shifted from favouring economic development to favouring democracy is said to have nevertheless produced a "fascinating finding." Michael Bratton et at., Public Opinion, Democracy, and Market Reform in Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 51, 55.

6 The West Africa correspondent for LeMonde has stated that in Africa "despite all its talk of brother hood and lack of colonial past, China remains unpopular," citing remarks by taxi drivers, street sellers and construction workers. Serge Michel, "When China met Africa," Foreign Policy, 1 May 2008, pp. 38-46. A Sunday Times (London) Africa correspondent, speaking of the Chinese presence in Africa, has stated that "at grassroots this is highly unpopular." R.W. Johnson, "China's empire-builders sweep up African riches," 16 July 2006. A Los Angeles Times journalist has focused on "popular resent

ment toward the Chinese." Robyn Dixon, "Africans lash out at China," 6 October 2006.

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The China Quarterly, 199, September 2009, pp. 728-759

sample surveys are at variance with the dominant Western media representation that only African ruling elites are positive about these links. Finally, based on our

own survey, we find that among the university-connected respondents in Africa,

the key variation is by country. All other variations, except gender, fade from sig nificance when country is taken into account.

Beyond what Africans think of China-Africa links is the question of why they

think as they do. We argue that the main determinants of variation in African perspectives are not "social" factors but how national political discourses of China-Africa play out in African states, where ruling elites and oppositions may or may not argue over how to interpret links with China. The national dis courses are predicated not so much on Chinese activities in this or that country as

by the internal political advantages that may accrue in raising the "Chinese pro blem." Part of the population may have negative reactions to discrete aspects of the Chinese presence, involving business competition or labour relations, but no generalized "Chinese problem" exists until politicians decide to create it. In that process, media influences or variations in China's relations with African countries play an auxiliary, but important, role in opinion formation.

Our survey's polar cases, Zambia and Sudan, are countries where there is sub stantial Chinese trade and investment; they are also the countries where we did our most extensive fieldwork. We would expect Zambians to be more likely to fault links with China because the leading opposition party made these links an electoral issue and, to a lesser extent, because Western media pervade Zambia. The Sudanese, however, should be more positive, because opposition parties have not "played the China card" and Western media influence is much less prominent.

We first discuss several multi- and single-country random sample polls that have not been noted in the international discourse of China-Africa links, despite their encompassing coverage of populations. We next set out findings from our survey and explain national differences among our respondents. Finally, we ana lyse the significance of the findings for the international discourse and for future research on views of China-Africa links.

Multi-Country Random Sample Surveys Africans have studied China-Africa links,7 but there is as yet no empirically based literature on African views of China. At a late 2006 forum, David Shinn, former US Ambassador to Ethiopia and Burkina Faso, "questioned about how much we really know about African publics' perception of China."8

7 See e.g. Kwesi Kwaa Prah (ed.), Afro-Chinese Relations: Past, Present and Future (Capetown: CASAS, 2007); Firoze Manji and Stephen Marks (eds.), African Perspectives on China in Africa (Oxford: Fahamu, 2007); Kweku Ampiah and Sanusha Naidu (eds.), Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon? China and Africa (Durban: University of Kwazulu-Natal Press, 2008).

8 "China's Africa strategy: a new approach to development and diplomacy?" Carnegie Endowment, 12 December 2006, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/index.cfm?fa=print&id=941.

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African Perspectives on China-Africa Links

Until then there had been anecdotal reporting but no systematic research on African views.9 The first relevant survey appeared in late 2006, just as the third Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) marked a new high in China-Africa links. In a Gallup poll of 1,000 adults each in 19 African states, 52 per cent approved of China's leaders and 60 per cent approved of US leaders. There were many "undecideds," however, and the younger the age group the more likely it was to approve of Chinese leaders.10

The 2007 Pew Global Attitudes Survey included polls of between 700 and 1,100 adults in each often African countries about the influences of China and

the United States.11 In this and the other random sample surveys we will discuss, respondents were typically asked about the effects of China and the US on their countries. Except for South Africa, whose disproportionately urban sample was overly white,12 respondents were twice as much, or more, favourable than unfavourable to China. In Cote d'lvoire and Mali, favourable views almost equalled the 93 per cent level of China itself. Nigeria had been the only African country where Pew in 2006 had asked views of China; then, 59 per cent of Nigerians were favourable; in 2007 it was 75 per cent.

Taking the whole survey, of the seven states where approval of China's econ omic effect on their countries was strongest, five were African. Four African countries were among the six states where approval of the effect of China's mili

tary power on their countries was strongest. No African state registered strong disapproval. When asked whether China's influence was a good or bad thing, from 52 per cent (South Africa) to 93 per cent (Mali) thought it good; the range for bad was 5 per cent (Ghana) to 33 per cent (Ethiopia).

The poll showed that views of China were more positive than views of the United States. Asked whether American influence was a good or bad thing, Africans (except in South Africa) favoured Chinese influence. In Tanzania and Ethiopia, many more thought American influence a bad thing than a good thing, a result absent from opinions of China in any African state. Elsewhere,

most respondents approved American influence, but China enjoyed much larger

9 Carol Wang and Danielle Flam, "Bridging the gap: experiences and attitudes in Sino-African relations," China Rights Forum (February 2007), pp. 196-208. A 33-country, 2005 random sample poll asked whether China's influence in the world is mainly positive or mainly negative. "Positive views were par ticularly widespread in Africa" (Senegal 73%, 6%; Nigeria 68%, 11%; Congo 59%, 12%; Kenya 59%, 7%; Tanzania 53%, 14%; Ghana 46%, 9%; South Africa 34%, 21%; Zimbabwe 34%, 17%). "BBC

World Service poll," http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/feb06A/,iewsCountries_Feb06_ quaire.pdf. A 2007 BBC poll showed Egypt 82%, 11%; Kenya 74%, 16%; Nigeria 67%, 16%; Ghana 56%, 16%. http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/apr08/BBCEvals_Apr08_rpt.pdf.

10 "Early impressions: Africans on US, Chinese leadership," November 2006, http://www.gallup.com/poll/ 25414/Early-Impressions-Africans-US-Chinese-Leadership-Part.aspx.

11 Pew Research Center, "47-nation Pew global attitudes survey," 27 June 2007, http://pewglobal.org/ reports/pdf/256.pdf.

12 A slight majority of black South Africans are urban; whites are "highly urbanized." "South Africa," http://encarta.msn.com/encylcopedia_761557321_3/south_africa.html. Our own South Africa survey's proportion of whites (34%) far exceeded that of whites in the South African population (9%) and was higher than that of whites among university students (27%). Robin Cohen, "Higher education in post-apartheid South Africa," http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/newsandevents/events/ac21/gsi_cohenr_-_ he_in_s_africa_post-apartheid.pdf.

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The China Quarterly, 199, September 2009, pp. 728-759

majorities: in Senegal, 86 per cent said China's role in their country helps make things better, compared with 56 per cent for the US; 91 per cent of Kenyans said

China affects their country for the good, compared with 74 per cent for the US. The 2008 Pew survey of 24 countries included Tanzania, Nigeria, Egypt and

South Africa. Its authors noted it was held during the unrest in Tibet but before the Sichuan earthquake, implying that the timing negatively influenced views of

China. Ratings of China nevertheless became marginally more positive in Nigeria (2007: 75 per cent favourable, 18 per cent unfavourable; 2008: 79 per cent and 14 per cent) and Tanzania (2007: 70 per cent and 11 per cent; 2008: 71 per cent and 8 per cent). In Egypt (2007: 65 per cent and 31 per cent; 2008: 59 per cent and 29 per cent) and South Africa (2007: 44 per cent and 47 per cent; 2008: 37 per cent and 51 per cent) opinions became more negative.

With the exception of respondents in China's longstanding strategic partner Pakistan, those in the three sub-Saharan African countries were more likely than people anywhere to conceive of China as a partner (Nigeria 78 per cent, Tanzania 74 per cent, South Africa 53 per cent), rather than an enemy or neither. These three countries also made up three of the five countries whose respondents were most likely to affirm that "China considers] interests of countries like yours" (Nigeria 69 per cent, Tanzania 57 per cent, South Africa 52 per cent). Nigerians and Tanzanians (South Africans were not asked) rated China higher than the US in terms of willingness to consider their country's point of view.

The three sub-Saharan countries' respondents were more positive about China than those of all countries except Pakistan. Nigerians said China positively influ ences their country by a much wider margin than other respondents. More than all others except Pakistanis, Nigerians and Tanzanians were positive about China's military power in their countries, while South Africans were negative by a ratio of 3:2. Tanzanians, Nigerians and South Africans were among the five most positive groups about China's economic influence; 87 per cent of Nigerians said it is good and 5 per cent said it is bad.

While most South Africans (53 per cent) and strong majorities of Nigerians (87 per cent) and Tanzanians (77 per cent) saw Chinese economic influence as posi tive, only 36 per cent of Nigerians, 31 per cent of South Africans and 17 per cent of Tanzanians so rated the US. Among Egyptians, 59 per cent rated China favourably, 29 per cent unfavourably; for the US it was 22 per cent and 75 per cent. Some 36 per cent of Egyptians rated China a partner and 24 per cent an enemy; 17 per cent saw the US a partner and 39 per cent an enemy. As to econ omic influence on Egypt, 47 per cent thought China's influence a good thing and 33 per cent a bad thing; for the US it was 10 per cent and 49 per cent.

Single-Country Random Sample Surveys Three single-country random sample surveys have been done. Gallup polled 1,000 adults in Chad in late 2006 on views of the United States, China and

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African Perspectives on China-Africa Links

France.13 For France 28 per cent were favourable and 54 per cent unfavourable; for China, 52 per cent and 19 per cent; for the US, 50 per cent and 28 per cent.

Chadians rated China more favourably than the US despite armed Chad-Sudan clashes and China's ties with Sudan.14 Asked about peoples, 53 per cent of Chadians were negative about the French, 24 per cent about Chinese and 29 per cent about Americans. A quarter favourably viewed the French; for Chinese it was 51 per cent and for Americans 48 per cent.

A late 2007 Gallup polled 1,000 adults in Sudan, excluding Darfur and parts of the south,15 with 29 per cent favourable to the US, 51 per cent unfavourable; 48

per cent favourable to China, 26 per cent unfavourable. The US's "very unfavourable" ratings were three times those for China; "very favourable ratings" for China were twice those for the US. Some 40 per cent of respondents viewed Americans unfavourably and 38 per cent favourably; for Chinese it was 21 per cent and 51 per cent. The survey head attributed China's higher ratings to a US focus on political settlements in Darfur and the south, sanctions, and Sudan's listing as a terrorism sponsor. In contrast, China has recently been involved in efforts to resolve the Darfur crisis, but mainly undertakes economic co-operation with Sudan.

A Research Tour Cameroon survey of 100 people each in ten cities was in response to discussions of a Chinese migrant "invasion."16 There has been a sharp rise in Africa's Chinese population, but numbers are exaggerated where the Chinese presence is an issue between ruling and opposition parties.17 In Cameroon, 70 per cent of respondents were disturbed by a Chinese influx, 25 per cent said they liked the Chinese coming, and for 5 per cent it did not matter;

yet 92 per cent accepted that China helps Cameroon's economy, for example by building infrastructure. Only 8 per cent held that the relationship harms Cameroon's economy, while 81 per cent welcomed Chinese products, mainly as affordable to the poor and aiding locals to set up businesses; 35 per cent cited affordable Chinese motorbikes creating taxi jobs for young men, thus redu

cing the crime rate. Asked who benefits most from the relationship, 70 per cent said the government, mainly through China's grants; 30 per cent said the poor,

mainly through affordable Chinese goods.

13 Megali Rheault, "Chadians view US, China more favorably than France," 18 February 2008, http:// www.gallup.com/poll/104404/Chadians-view-US-China-More-Favorably-Than-France.aspx.

14 "China, Chad vow to boost military cooperation," Xinhua, 21 September 2007. 15 Magali Rheault, "United States, China elicit different opinions," 10 June 2008, http://www.gallup.com/

poo/107785/United-States-China-Elicit-Different-Opinions-Sudan.aspx. 16 Ivo Ngome, "Cameroonian perceptions of the Chinese invasion," AfricaFiles: At Issue Ezine, Vol. 6

(2007), http://www.africafiles.org/atissueezine.asp?issue=issue6. 17 "China's African syndrome," Daily Mail (London), 25 July 2008 (claim of 50,000 in Zimbabwe). But

see John Karumbidza, "Win-win economic cooperation: can China save Zimbabwe's economy?" in Manji and Marks, African Perspectives, pp. 87-105 (less than 10,000); "Politicians differ over influx of Chinese traders into country," Namibian TV, 29 January 2007, in BBC Monitoring Africa, 31 January 2007 (opposition leaders claim 40,000 Chinese; our July 2008 interviews of Chinese there found a consensus of 4,000).

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The China Quarterly, 199, September 2009, pp. 728-759

The Ruling Elites/People Binary Refuted: Interpreting the Random Sample Surveys The discourse of China-Africa in Western media is often a binary that represents

African rulers as authoritarian, inept, corrupt allies of China, attracted to it by mutual unconcern with Western-urged good governance, transparency, human rights and environmental protection.18 Western governments that view China as a strategic competitor in Africa contribute to this depiction.19 Some scholars position China on one side of a leaders/peoples dichotomy: a British specialist has put it that "[China is] not listening to the African people's wills; [it is] listening to African elites' will."20 Yet African leaders (except in Zimbabwe and Sudan) who are "friends of China" are usually also friends of Western powers, as shown, for example, by the US having much more developed military relations with African states than does China.21

In Western media depictions, "the people," through opposition parties, resist elite ingratiation of China. Yet where the Chinese presence is a domestic political

issue (Zambia, Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, Lesotho, Senegal), ruling par ties do win "free and fair" elections, making it anomalous to equate opposition parties with the vox populi. Parties in many African states are also often indistin guishable ideologically: Zambia's three major parties, for example, are all neo-liberalist.22

18 Giles Mohan and Marcus Power, "New African choices? The politics of Chinese engagement," Review of African Political Economy, No. 115 (2008), pp. 23^12.

19 See "China-Africa relations and the global village: diplomatic perspective," State Department Documents and Publications, 7 April 2008; "EU to pursue partnership with China in Africa," EUobserver.com, 10 January 2008. For the debate on China-US competition in Africa, compare William Lyakurwa, "American and Chinese activities in Africa – and African priorities for the future," Brenthurst Foundation Discussion Paper 6/2008, http://www.robmillard.com/Brenthurst%20Discussion %20Paper%206%202008%20Lyakurwa%20China%20%20US%20in%20Africa.pdf; Padraig Carmody and Francis Owusu, "Competing hegemons? Chinese versus American geo-economic srategies in Africa," Political Geography, Vol. 26, No. 5 (2007), pp. 504-24; Michael Klare and Daniel Volman, "America, China and the scramble for Africa's oil," Review of African Political Economy, No. 108 (2006), pp. 297-309; with Xu Yi-chong, "China and the United States in Africa: coming conflict or com

mercial coexistence," Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 62, No. 1 (2008), pp. 16-37; and Jedrzej Frynas and Manuel Paulo, "A new scramble for African oil? Historical, political and business perspectives," African Affairs, Vol. 106, No. 523 (2007), pp. 229-51.

20 Darren Taylor, "Chinese aid flows into Africa," Voice of America, 8 May 2007. See also Geoffrey York, "China, Africa forging closer ties," Globe and Mail (Canada), 6 November 2006 (Canadian academic: "China is pulling out all stops to honor African leaders and curry favor with African elites"). See also Sanusha Naidu and Daisy Mbazima, "China-Africa relations: a new impulse in a changing continental landscape," Futures, No. 40 (2008), pp. 748-61 (China appears to present "tantalizing opportunity" to

African elites, but "terrifying threat" to Africa's citizenry). 21 William H?rtung and Frieda Berrigan, "Militarization of US Africa policy: 2000-2005," World Policy

Institute (2005); http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/Africa_Fact_Sheet_EAD_March_ 2005.pdf; Daniel Volman and William Minter, "Making peace or fueling war in Africa?" Foreign Policy in Focus, 13 March 2009; "China's Africa strategy: a new approach to development and diplo macy?" (Ambassador Shinn notes that "China is far behind other countries, such as the United States, Canada and Germany in its military aid to Africa."); Jacques DeLisle, "Into Africa: China's quest for resources and influence," Foreign Policy Research Institute, E-Notes, 19 February 2007, http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200702.delisle.intoafricachinasquest.html ("Beijing's Africa policy has brought no security alliance or significant military assistance").

22 Neo Simutanyi, "Neo-liberalism and the relevance of Marxism to Africa: the case of Zambia," 2006,

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