Each Module 2 through 7 has an associated small group discussion that should focus on discussing the course content for that Module. Each discussion will span the two-weeks of the Module. Each grou

17

1. Collaboration: what does it really mean? Margaret Stout and Robyn Keast

INTRODUCTION

Collaboration is an important yet contested concept in public management. Collaboration is widely argued to be the best approach for generating more fruitful outcomes than can be achieved independently. Purported benefits range from innovative and creative solutions to wicked problems and enhancing democratic engagement and equity to minimizing risk, achieving more effective outcomes, and doing more with less through resource sharing and eliminating redundancies. In short, collaboration is thought to be the smart thing to do and the right thing to do.

Recognizing the limitations of current inter-organizational arrays (Williams, 2016), there has been a frequent search for typologies that will be more useful to research on collaborative practices (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Mandell & Keast, 2007). Building from previous work (Keast, 2015, 2016d; Stout, Bartels, & Love, 2019), this chapter contributes to the development of “typologies of different kinds of CGRs [Collaborative Governance Regimes]” (Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2012, p. 22). More specifically, we seek to generate a typology that pre- cisely defines collaboration and differentiates it from similar and related terms. Without such clarification, there is a continuing risk of conceptually messy and weak foundations for both research and practice.

Toward this end, this chapter seeks to unpack the full and precise meaning of collaboration by adding an analysis of power dynamics in varied ways of working together. As have others (see for example, Popp, Milward, MacKean, Casebeer, & Lindstrom, 2014), we argue that how power is held and wielded fundamentally alters how we work together and determines whether genuine collaboration is achieved. Therefore, we will use varied forms of power to clearly define collaboration and differentiate it from similar terms. We review literature in a broad array of disciplines (e.g., business, public administration and policy, planning and geography, community development, sociology, social work, and education) to get a clear sense of how the term collaboration is being used and to differentiate its characteristics from coordination and cooperation, in particular. In other words, what exactly does it mean to collaborate?

A basic complicating factor is linguistic in nature: collaboration is used as an action (verb) or as an entity or structure (noun), while its variants are used as descriptors of either (adverbs and adjectives) (Lewis, Ross, & Holden, 2012). As a verb, collaboration is often used inter- changeably with cooperation and coordination to depict interaction between organizations, and these are sometimes subsumed within each other. For example, Alter and Hage (1993) conceptualize collaboration as a sub-set of cooperation, while government documents fre- quently use coordination and collaboration to describe similar interactions (see for example, Wanna, Phillimore, Fenna, & Harwood, 2009). Collaboration as a noun is often equated with inter-organizational entities or structures formed to facilitate interaction such as networks, alliances, partnerships, or joint ventures (Cropper, Ebers, Huxham, & Ring, 2008). Taken together, these applications serve to confound or subsume the meaning of collaboration, as

Margaret Stout and Robyn Keast – 9781789901917 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 02/26/2021 12:08:06PM

via free access

18 Handbook of collaborative public management

suggested by Todeva and Knoke (2005) and others (see for example, Keast, 2015; Morris & Miller-Stevens, 2016; Williams, 2016).

Complicating matters further, the many structural names for working together (nouns and adjectives) do not necessitate the specific relational dynamics within them (verbs and adverbs), despite these dimensions being inherent to any form of social interaction. For example, while conglomerates, amalgamations, and mergers may infer consolidation, and rivalry and exchange may infer competition, other organizational arrangements are decidedly more com- plicated. While alliances, coalitions, and networks may often reflect coordination, they may also include elements of collaboration, cooperation, and competition. While partnerships and joint ventures may often display cooperation, they may also include elements of competition, collaboration, and coordination. To understand which type of structural arrangement might foster the act of collaboration most effectively, we must first clearly define and differentiate collaboration from both similar and substantially different behaviors (e.g., coordination and cooperation, versus consolidation and competition).

Collaboration’s etymology clearly suggests working together: to “co-labor.” This meaning stems from the late Latin collaborare, signifying “to labor with or together” (Lewis & Short, 1879, p. 365). The verb collaborate was introduced into English in the mid-1800s, and with the French ending “tion” was subsequently used also as a noun. Since then, the term collaboration has been adopted by public management and many other practice disciplines (e.g., business, engineering/construction, international relations/development, social work, community devel- opment, education, etc.), each contributing their own interpretation. This transference across sectors has led to muddled meanings (Morris & Miller-Stevens, 2016; Todeva & Knoke, 2005). A review of recent selections across these disciplines produced the following observa- tions. Business scholars take a distinctive instrumental approach; collaboration is undertaken to access beneficial resources and leverage strategic relationships (Davis, 2016; Loosemore & Richard, 2015). Governance scholars (public management, administration, and policy) also describe a dominant instrumental and resource sharing purpose, but for solving public prob- lems and producing public value (de Loë, Murray, & Simpson, 2015; Hafer, 2017; Hsieh & Liou, 2016; Ulibarra, 2018; Vangen, 2017). It is also clear that these scholars assume govern- ment oversees coordinating procedures and activities. Planning, social work, and community development scholars seem to have the strongest understanding of collaboration as originally defined. In these disciplines, collaboration is described as a process method used in joint delib- eration, decision-making, and action (Southby & Gamsu, 2018; Ulibarra, 2018). The emphasis is on participative, egalitarian relationships and facilitated micro-processes and interpersonal relations. Therefore, collaboration is a prominent example of a stretched term—one whose meaning has expanded to the degree that it has lost specificity in comparison with related, yet substantively different meanings.

In the field of public management—our primary concern herein—unpacking the meaning and practice of collaboration is a challenge that has been taken up by collaborative governance and network governance scholars, who tend to argue network structures that seek to govern inquiry, deliberation, decision-making, and action collaboratively are the most promising combination for fruitful outcomes—the “collaborative advantage” (Huxham, 1996). The literature’s dual emphasis on both structure and process does provide important insights to the study and practice of collaboration. In many ways, macro-level governance structures are shaped by micro-level interactions in a scaffolding process, and in turn, the character- istics of micro-interactions are constrained by macro-level structures (Cohen, 2008). Thus,

Margaret Stout and Robyn Keast – 9781789901917 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 02/26/2021 12:08:06PM

via free access

Collaboration: what does it really mean? 19

attitudes, intentions, and behaviors shape structure, and structure perpetuates the originating dispositions. However, as has been argued by others (see for example, Ansell, 2011; Stout & Love, 2015), on their own, structural properties and various procedural approaches to working together are not sufficient to generate genuine collaboration and must be shored up and facilitated by many micro-level attitudes, behaviors, and interactions of collaborators (Keast, 2016b). Thus, a more careful definition is necessary to functionally, as opposed to structurally, differentiate collaboration.

The in-depth analysis of the collaborative governance literature provided by Stout and Love (2019) demonstrates that empirical studies have not identified the particular relational dynamics that differentiate collaboration from other approaches to working together because in practice, many actors display behaviors that are not actually collaborative. Lumping those behaviors into the definition of “collaboration” simply because they are found in a “govern- ance network” has muddied the waters, rather than clarifying them (Stout et al., 2019). Indeed, studies find that many governance networks are not fully collaborative, as hierarchy and/or competition can dominate their operations (Davies, 2009; Innes & Booher, 2010; Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998; Mandell & Keast, 2007). Therefore, many argue that substantial changes to relational dynamics are required to achieve genuine collaboration (Gray, 1989; Innes & Booher, 2010; Keast, Mandell, Brown, & Woolcock, 2004; Stout et al., 2019; Stout & Love, 2017).

In sum, for those studying and practicing public governance, management, and administra- tion, “collaboration remains an elusive concept” (Chen, 2008, p. 349). One of the most impor- tant barriers to collaborative success is that of “process breakdowns due to protracted human relations processes” (Agranoff, 2008, p. 345). What exact relational attitudes and behaviors support collaborative functions such as “interactive processing” and “mutual engagement and mutual adjustment” (Agranoff, 2008, p. 344)? What particular type of culture “builds collab- orative community” (Agranoff, 2008, p. 343)? To answer such questions, “we must turn our attention to the dispositions that prefigure interpersonal dynamics along with organizational process designs that either hinder or foster collaboration” (Stout et al., 2019, p. 99). A more detailed and nuanced unpacking of collaboration’s distinctive characteristics that takes greater account of these micro-level practices in action (Grove, Dainty, Thompson, & Thorpe, 2018) will enable evaluations of which particular relational dynamics lead to the most democratic and best instrumental outcomes.

In the following sections, we clarify the meanings of varied ways of working together to differentiate collaboration from consolidation, coordination, competition, cooperation, and clientelism. We begin by defining each of the most used approaches to working together, explaining its purpose, how it is ensured, the principal form of power used, the associated governance approach, and the typical relational and behavioral characteristics. With this defi- nition in hand, we offer a concrete public management example to illustrate. We use guidance from a recently proposed governance typology (see Stout & Love, 2016), along with a power typology to clarify these differences. With this extended typology of ways of working together in hand, we synthesize and summarize the differentiating characteristics of collaboration and offer conclusions about why these meanings matter for future research and practice.

Margaret Stout and Robyn Keast – 9781789901917 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 02/26/2021 12:08:06PM

via free access

20 Handbook of collaborative public management

VARIED WAYS OF WORKING TOGETHER

While several typologies of inter-organizational arrangements have been developed and have provided important insights into different ways of working together, they have not yet fully clarified relational nuances that meaningfully influence collaborative processes and outcomes. Some typologies focus on cataloging the formalized institutional structures (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994), while others seek to differentiate based on a mix of behavioral and structural defining features (Himmelmann, 1994; Mashek & Nanfito, 2015; McNamara, 2012). One such typology, the “Five Cs” (Keast, 2015), considers the characteristics of competition, coop- eration, coordination, collaboration, and consolidation along a continuum from least to most intensive interactions, in that order. Somewhat like nesting Matryoshka dolls, each term builds upon and extends the shared dimensions and functional logic of the previous term—especially among the middle three. Indeed, the behavioral similarities at the center of this relational continuum of coordination, collaboration, and cooperation—the “Three Cs” as previously conceptualized (Brown & Keast, 2003; Keast, 2016b)—has led to a tendency to use the terms interchangeably, despite growing agreement that collaboration exhibits distinctive characteris- tics (Gray, 1989; Himmelmann, 1994; Morris & Miller-Stevens, 2016; Wood & Gray, 1991). Herein, we will add an additional “C” into the spectrum—clientelism—to better accommodate a comprehensive analysis of power dynamics in varied ways of relating and working together.

Taking a fresh look at the similarities and differences, we find that collaboration is more analogous to how Stout and Love (2016) conceptualize the Integrative Governance position as sitting apart from the spectrum of other approaches to governance (i.e., Holographic, Hierarchical, Atomistic, and Fragmented). This linkage to the Governance Arc highlights the issue of power dynamics in varied ways of working together and the transformative effects of collaboration. Ostensibly, the value produced by collaboration is generated by the removal of hierarchical command and control structures as well as the strategic self-interested behavior of market actors (Huxham, 1996; Powell, 1990)—both of which generate asymmetrical power relations. Further, one of the driving forces identified in collaborative dynamics is how power is held and exercised (Crosby & Bryson, 2007). When actors bring power dynamics grounded in their relative social, economic, and organizational status in other contexts into collaborative action (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999), the fundamental characteristics of collaboration are undermined to one degree or another. Different ways of working together tend to exhibit particular forms of power: cooperative power can be used to further self-interest, while coordinative power often draws on force, coercion, and the ability to control the discourse, process, and solutions (Dewulf & Elbers, 2018). By contrast, collaborators exercise shared power (Gray, 1994).

Huxham and Vangen (2005) argue that power-over is orientated toward one’s own gain, power-to is oriented toward mutual gain, and power-for is oriented toward altruistic gain. More commonly, power typologies differentiate power-over, power-within, power-to, and power-with (Follett, 2003c; Gaventa, 2006; Ledwith, 2011; Purdy, 2012). Power-over is the typical way power is understood in modern society, wherein one can control or influence others. Power-to is described as agency, or the ability to act as one chooses. Power-with is understood as solidarity, wherein one acts in egalitarian mutuality with others. Power-within is the sense of self-efficacy and authentic identity that is enabled and strengthened among those most empowered: those in control of power-over, those most benefitted in power-to, and all participants in power-with. All forms of power can be wielded in ways that are perceived to

Margaret Stout and Robyn Keast – 9781789901917 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 02/26/2021 12:08:06PM

via free access

Figure 1.1 Arc of working together

Collaboration: what does it really mean? 21

legitimate, depending upon the expectations of participants. Yet, differing power dynamics produce attitudinal and relational micro-processes and behaviors that affect both processes and outcomes.

Reconsidering the “Five Cs” (Keast, 2015, 2016c) using the lenses of the Governance Arc (Stout & Love, 2016) and these nuanced forms of power, we reconfigure the varied ways of working together on a spectrum of ideal-types that differentiate collaboration (power-with) from coordination and consolidation, which move along the arc in the direction of control and unification (power-over), while cooperation and competition move along the arc in the direc- tion of independent operations and fragmentation (power-to) (see Figure 1.1). At the center, power-for reflects a charitable or public service form of clientelism (see Figure 1.1). Each of these forms of power can produce negative outcomes for some. Because only power-with builds power-within among all participants, we believe this repositioning helps clarify pre- cisely where the positive overlaps with coordination and cooperation end and the unique and advantageous features of collaboration stand apart.

The following sub-sections will unpack our hypothesis in detail. Each will define the term, consider it in relation to the Governance Typology (Stout & Love, 2016) and forms of power, and provide an example of how it usually works.

Consolidation

Positioned at the bottom left in Figure 1.1, consolidation means “the process of becoming or being made stronger and more certain” (Cambridge University Press, 2019). For example, the amalgamation of two or more smaller entities into a new entity or the absorption of one

Margaret Stout and Robyn Keast – 9781789901917 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 02/26/2021 12:08:06PM

via free access

22 Handbook of collaborative public management

entity by another creates strength through the combination of assets, liabilities, and finances (Chalmers & Davis, 2001) and efficiencies through the reduction of redundant personnel or processes (Harman, 1993). As per classic theories of bureaucracy, the focus and control pos- sible within a single administrative macro-structure allows for resources to be better deployed to meet goals, and reduces the time and effort directed toward turf protection between entities. Consolidation works best when actors are willing to give up authority as opposed to a hostile takeover, nonetheless, consolidation typically relies on power-over directives from a central authority. While consolidation rarely denotes equal power, there is nonetheless a possibility that a more even distribution may evolve over time, especially if organizations are of equiva- lent size and influence (Tienari & Vaara, 2012). Consolidation is most similar to Holographic Governance (Stout & Love, 2016) because mergers require a unifying vision or mission. Even if voluntary, power-over demands homogenization that Follett (1998) describes as “imitation” (37) or “the crowd trying to preserve itself as it is…” (Follett, 2013, p. 128)—a characteristic that hinders creative innovation and limits power-to and power-within for most participants.

Examples of consolidation in government include the structural reconfiguration of several departments into a mega-department (Chalmers & Davis, 2001; Mannheim, 2019) or the merger of smaller local government municipalities into larger jurisdictions, such as has been witnessed in Europe (Fox & Gurley-Calvez, 2006), the United States (Nelson & Stenberg, 2018), and Australia. For example, in 2016 the New South Wales state government created 19 newly amalgamated local councils in order to deliver more effective services with greater efficiency (Dollery, 2016). In each case, those with less power experience some degree of disempowerment as authority is centralized.

Coordination

Moving toward center in Figure 1.1, coordination means “to make separate things work together” (Cambridge University Press, 2019) and is applied especially when there is a need to more efficiently align resources or orchestrate functions in an ordered manner to meet pre- determined goals (Dunsire, 1978; Mulford & Rogers, 1982). While much less structured and stringent than consolidation, coordination typically relies on power-over relational dynamics that center a lead organization or individual with the authority to direct others. These hierar- chical tendencies (Painter, 1987) align coordination with Hierarchical Governance (Stout & Love, 2016), in which orders are often “hardly distinguishable from coercion” (Follett, 2013, p. 200). While not as constraining as consolidation, power-to and power-within for most participants are hindered by centralized mandates, formal objectives, rules and procedures, or compelling incentives to establish goals and methods, ensure expected behavior, resolve conflict (Dunsire, 1978), or even mandate involvement (Bachmann, 2001). Furthermore, since coordination requires actions to flow in a sequential manner (i.e., B requires A to do their part in order to progress) (Thompson, 1967), participants are dependent on others and this power-over dynamic is distributed throughout the system.

Coordination can be seen in distinct public and nonprofit agencies joined up in a coali- tion led by one agency in particular (Mulford & Rogers, 1982). For example, a coalition of government and nonprofit organizations that work in similar service arenas might be tasked with implementing varied aspects of a whole government policy. Generally, such efforts are coordinated by the lead government agency in what has been called a “meta-governance” role (Sørensen & Torfing, 2009). Alternatively, we see coordination in “one-stop shops” where

Margaret Stout and Robyn Keast – 9781789901917 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 02/26/2021 12:08:06PM

via free access

Collaboration: what does it really mean? 23

multiple services are clustered in one location, with one agency playing a central coordinating role in service management. Therefore, the coordinator holds some type of authority over other members to direct their behavior.

Competition

At the bottom right of Figure 1.1, competition means “an activity done by a number of people or organizations, each of which is trying to do better than all the others” (Cambridge University Press, 2019). Thus, the primary relationship is a rivalry between two or more independent parties (Bish, 1978, p. 23). However, competition is also used in exchange, which brings independent actors into single or serial transactions under conditions of self-interest, each party exercising power-to and avoiding power-over to the greatest degree possible. In these transactions, power-within is generated only amongst “the winners.” As Thompson and Sanders (1998) suggest, such an adversarial mentality can readily lead to conflict, defensive positions, and ultimately disjointed or conflictual relationships. In Fragmented Governance (Stout & Love, 2016), pluralist competition is taken to its greatest extreme and individualist anarchism emerges as the only viable political and economic form—governance by none. With this elimination of macro-structures and reliance on purely transactional micro-processes, mutually desirable outcomes are a matter of coincidence rather than intent.

Competition can be seen in the growth of government policies applying market principles and policies that expose public sector services to competitive forces and contracting out to reduce service costs and increase efficiencies (Productivity Commission, 2017). Competition is also evident in departments and non-government bodies trying to limit what they share with those who in other circumstances would be rivals for clients, scarce resources, or funding (Smyth, Malbon, & Carey, 2017). In such cases, win–lose outcomes predominate.

Cooperation

Moving to the left in Figure 1.1, cooperation refers to when one “helps willingly when asked” (Cambridge University Press, 2019). In cooperative relationships, each entity remains separate, retaining its own autonomy, resources, and authority (Ciglar, 2001; Mulford & Rogers, 1982; Winer & Ray, 1994) and voluntarily engages in mutually beneficial exchanges. Thompson (1967) explains that in such pooled interdependence, only small mutual adjustments are made. Thus, cooperation still reflects power-to relational dynamics, as behaviors relate to individual rather than collective goals (Mandell, 2002). This willingness to independently work toward limited shared purposes aligns cooperation with Atomistic Governance (Stout & Love, 2016), in which pluralist actors are expected to maintain a high degree of liberty and self-sufficiency while operating under shared rules. Actors take a strategic stance toward getting what they want, with encounters being characterized by protective behavior and negotiated bargaining. While moderated, these power-to behaviors can still result in compromises in which all parties lose something (Follett, 2003a), including both power-over and power-within.

Cooperation can be seen in interagency meetings where members come together to share basic information so that each can go about their business more effectively. For example, in cooperative federalism initiatives such as the Council of Australian Governments (COAG), inter-governmental agreements are reached and statements of cooperation are developed that

Margaret Stout and Robyn Keast – 9781789901917 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 02/26/2021 12:08:06PM

via free access

24 Handbook of collaborative public management

support local autonomy, while also acting as a precursor to joint actions (Wanna et al., 2009, p. 11).

Clientelism

Referring to the center of the arc in Figure 1.1, Huxham and Vangen (2005) argue that power-for is oriented toward altruistic gain, wherein power is transferred from one person to another and includes some form of “user involvement” (p. 176). While not a perfect fit, we associate power-for with clientelism because it involves asymmetric relationships between empowered actors or “patrons” and their clients. Clientelism is a method of contingent exchange that features implicit or explicit quid pro quo agreements (Hicken, 2011)—even if it is only the enjoyable feeling of altruism, charity, or service. Furthermore, in many public and nonprofit agencies, service to a client is contingent upon the recipient acting in accordance with the agency’s expectations. For example, when we obey the law, we receive police protec- tion; when we follow the rules, we receive public education, welfare assistance, and the like.

The positive view on this relational dynamic is well-illustrated in Ostrom’s conception of co-production, wherein public servants rely on citizens to achieve their aims and all benefit from the relationship (Alford, 2014). Unfortunately, exercising power-for another person can also diminish their power-within and their own power-to because it does not necessarily foster development. At its worst, clientelist advocacy, service, and charity keep clients “poor and dependent” (Hicken, 2011, p. 289). As the oft-cited adage illustrates, giving someone a fish to eat does not empower them, while teaching them to fish does. The risk of disempowering “help” is a growing critique in the social justice and community development literature (Pearson, 1999; Toomey, 2009).

Collaboration

At its most basic, collaboration occurs when “two or more people work together to create or achieve the same thing” (Cambridge University Press, 2019). However, as currently under- stood, the “thing” is not pre-determined, that is, it emerges out of repeated interactions and relational processes (routines, artifacts, communications) to form the synergies capable of co-creating something new (Mandell, 2002) or co-create a new whole from existing parts (Innes & Booher, 2010). Such efforts are best achieved through structural arrangements that enable horizontal authority and flexibility in response to ongoing change. Such “structured nonhierarchical social interaction” (Thayer, 1981, p. A38) is neither hierarchical nor competi- tive (Powell, 1990). This is precisely why network governance has become linked to collabo- rative governance (Keast, 2016a).

While important, form is insufficient to ensure the functional differences of collaboration. A “relational disposition” and a “cooperative style of relating” within a “participatory mode of association” (Stout & Love, 2017) are also required to ensure effective collaboration. Specifically, participants must have a disposition that acknowledges interconnection and inter- dependence (Innes & Booher, 2010) or reciprocal interdependence (Thompson, 1967). These assumptions are the ethical foundation for a commitment to mutuality (or generalized reci- procity) (Huxham & Vangen, 2005), trusting and respectful interpersonal relations (Mandell, 2002), and communicative capacity (Bartels, 2015). Furthermore, a transparent, facilitated integrative process must be employed to ensure shared engagement in and responsibility for

Margaret Stout and Robyn Keast – 9781789901917 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 02/26/2021 12:08:06PM

via free access

Collaboration: what does it really mean? 25

inquiry, dialogue, constructive conflict, deliberation, consensus-oriented decisions, action, and evaluative reflection (Flynn, 2019; Gray, 1989; Keast, Koliba, & Voets, 2019). These participative practices build mutual understanding and shared language and identity, which further strengthen interpersonal relationships, a sense of power-within, and a commitment to shared purpose. This type of cohesion is necessary for sustained synergistic efforts (Larson, Rottinghaus, & Borgen, 2002). Thus, the relational process itself is the connective tissue that establishes and susta