Compare the EOKA to the FLN in Algeria. What similarities and differences exist? In what way were the FLN innovative? What are the claims of the Sikh separatists? How valid ar

Nationalistic Terrorism

Bruce Holman (198, p. 48-69, 2006, p. 43-63) of Gre stratesy airity one of the Protes torting spert on trorism, ses the polities and rotrite enticolonial revolu

tont the trenteth century as the basis for modern terrorist Ca developed as former coln in rejected European dominance of their cultures, Terrorist campaigns were aimed a the security fores, and they also targeted audiences in the imperial homelands. Wie terroris eaders sought out opportunities to gain sympathy from the international community and anti-imperialist voters in the home country.

A series of anticolonial revolts took place all over the worid from the late 1940s to the ealy 1960s. uropean powers retreated in the face of guerilla war and terrorism. When revolutionaries of similar language, culture, and traditions fought to create or maintain a common identity, they appealed to a sense of nationalism. In fact, terrorism was justified under a banner of nationalism. Nationalistic terrorism refers to violent terrorism waged on the basis of a shared sense of common political unity, cultural traditions, or ethnic freedom. It can be the basis for long-term separatist terrorism — as shown with the Basque region of Spain and struggles in Ireland-and it also appeared in anticolonial struggles after World War II.

Revolts were numerous because Europe had colonized much of the world, but three cases can be used to illustrate differing styles of nationalistic terrorism. Ruled directly by the British, Cyprus became the scene of urban terrorism, and Britain fought rural nationalistic terrorists in Kenya. France fought a brutal multifaceted campaign in Algeria, experiencing multiple forms of terrorism and responding with repressive terror. Though hardly a comprehensive review of anticolonial revolutions, the three cases represent the major patterns that dominated terrorism in the wars of independence. Similar styles of terrorism appear in nationalistic violence today.

Cyprus, 1955-1959

The United Kingdom retreated from its empire throughout the 1950s, sometimes negotiating peaceful withdrawals and, at other times, fighting small uprisings. Having claimed Cyprus (Figure 7.1) as a crown colony after World War I, Britain established its Middle East military headquarters there at the end of World War II, and Cypriots of Greek descent deeply resented British control. They sought unification with Greece, but Turkish Cypriots, formerly governed by the Ottoman Empire, looked to Turkey. Tensions seethed below the surface while the British remained in control (Paul and Spirit, 2008).

Georgios Grivas (1898-1974) had been an officer in the Greek Army. Unconcerned with the Turkish population on Cyprus, he appealed to Greek nationalism. Grivas created an organization to overthrow the British, the Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters; BOKA). He developed a twofold strategy based on gaining international sympathy and confronting superior British forces in Cypriot cities (Coyle, 1983, pp. 151-187).

Grivas reasoned that small groups of BOKA terrorists could strike in Cypriot cities. thwarting any potential military offensive against rebel forces. BOKA bombing began

with a series of attacks in April 1955. Another series of explosions came two months later, including an attack on a police station. The Cypriots rioted at times during the summer, and the United Kingdom responded with force. A new governor, a former field marshal, imposed harsh penalties, including capital punishment for crimes less than murder. This produced the effect that Grivas had been seeking- press coverage and international sympathy. Terrorists hid in Cypriot cities, and the vast numbers of British troops found few of them (Fairfield, 1959). Responding to international pressure from allies and British citizens who opposed colonial repression, the United Kingdom negotiated a deal with the EOKA in February 1959. As Bruce Hoffman (1998, p. 60) points out, terrorism worked.

The Battle for Algiers, 1954-1962

France began colonizing Algeria in 1830 (Figure 7.2). They brutally used military force to subdue the population in the vast interior of Algeria and flooded the Mediterranean coast with Europeans. By 1881, the north was officially absorbed into France, and after 1889, any European born in the new territory received French citizenship. Some Algerians benefited from the move, but the majority deeply resented the loss of autonomy. They formed patriotic associations seeking to free their homeland, and after France itself had been occupied and liberated, they thought the French would grant independence (Branche, 2008).

By 1953, France, like the United Kingdom, was retreating from its colonial empire, and the French people approved. They relinquished control of colony after colony, but not Algeria.

The northern coast was not an imperial holding, most French people reasoned; it was part of France. When Algerian nationalists made overtures for independence, the French go. ernment thought that granting their request was out of the question. Algerian revolutionaries formed the National Liberation Front (FLN) and decided to frighten the Europeans out of their country.

David Galula (1963, pp. 9-25) produced one of the best studies of the ensuing con flict. Too impatient to launch a guerrilla campaign from the interior regions of Algeria, the FLN decided to strike directly in areas dominated by French colonials and terrorize them with sensational violence. The FLN launched a campaign of blind terrorism in 1954.

Although its leaders planned to shift to selective terrorism, they never really abandoned indiscriminate violence.

The FLN began its campaign on November 1, 1954, launching 70 clandestine attacks against an unsuspecting enemy. Raphaëlle Branche (2008) says that a most dreadful attack came almost a year later in August 1955, when groups from the FLN slipped into Algerian suburbs and outlying French towns to massacre entire groups of colonial families. Their primary tactic was to slit the throats of their victims, making sure their bodies would be on display the next morning.

Females played an important role in this struggle. FLN leaders noted that French police officers and soldiers were more likely to confront men than women, so they used females to carry weapons and communiqués. As the fighting grew more intense, the role of women increased. Women were able to infiltrate the French areas of Algiers, so the FLN stuffed their handbags with explosives. The women roamed through French urban environments in European dress, depositing their time bombs in highly populated areas. They frequently targeted gathering places known to attract large numbers of French youth (Branche, 2008).

Hoffman (1998, pp. 62-65) and Branche (2008) point out that French forces played into the hands of the FLN. As violence increased, they employed tactics of mass arrests, torture, and murder. Algerian opinion quickly turned against France, and by the late 1950s, world opinion was shifting, too. The French made a costly tactical mistake.

Brutal counterterrorist tactics drove Algerian sympathy toward the FLN, and French citizens eventually lost their taste for a dirty war. Galula (1963, p. 5), one of the few observers to grasp the meaning of the French campaign, said the tactics alienated the very people the security forces needed to attract. Counterinsurgency, he concluded, requires public support and sympathy, yet French forces received little support for their murderous behavior. Algeria received independence in 1962. Terrorism triumphed again.