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Sociological Perspectives Vol. 41, No. 2, pp. 243-258 Copyright ?1998 Pacific Sociological Association ISSN 0731-1214

MUST SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY AND SOCIOLOGICAL PRACTICE BE SO FAR APART?:

A Polemical Answer

JONATHAN H. TURNER*

Univerisity of California, Riverside

ABSTRACT: It is argued that sociological theory and its applications to

real world problems should constitute the core of the discipline. Yet, the notion of "socioligical practice" is abandoned in favor of a more rigorous application of sociological theory and research to engineering applications.

Sociology should redefine and reorient its practive to create an engineering

dicipline where abstract theoretical principles are boiled down to rules of

thumb and used to build or tear down social structures. By adopting an

engineering orientation, sociological thoery and research will be more

focused and useful.

Most sociologists entered the discipline because they were interested in people and concerned about humanity. Virtually all of us, to varying degrees, wanted "to help people" and "make the world better." Very few of us aspired to be quantita- tive methodologists, or even researchers who would develop and use new meth- odologies and the latest statistical techniques, nor did we enter sociology to become theorists who would articulate abstract models and theories about the operation of the universe. Ask the average sociology major about their aspirations, and they will only rarely say that they want to do what we force them to do if they continue in the discipline-namely, learn quantitative methodology, study the classic theorists and, depending upon the program, learn various genres of contemporary "theory." There is, of course, nothing wrong with this emphasis, per se, since any discipline should be driven and shaped by its theories and meth- odologies. But something more happens in graduate school: the impulse that made us interested in sociology in the first place-the desire to contribute some- thing useful to the problems of the world-gets lost, often being beaten out of us by courses in methods and theory. Moreover, if we retain an interest in social problems, we must often become ideologues-whether Marxists, feminists, post- modernists, or some other radical viewpoint-in order to set ourselves apart and

*Direct all correspondence to: Jonathan H. Turner, Univerisity of Califomia, Dept. of Sociology, 083, 900 University Ave., Riverside, CA 92521-0419; e-mail: [email protected]

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244 SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES Volume 41, Number 2, 1998

protect us from "mainstream" sociology. Thus, a great deal of normal sociology today has little to do with our initial fascination with the field as undergraduates, or if these impulses are retained, we are pushed to the ideological fringes of the discipline. In either case, sociological practice and the practice of sociology become separated, moving in different universes and passing each other in broad daylight.

In this paper, I want to examine this splitting of the discipline, especially the separation of scientific theory and practice, and propose what may seem like an outrageous solution: the creation of an engineering branch in the discipline. I choose the word "engineering" partly for its shock value, but I have much more in mind: to move sociology back in the realm of public debate and policy by explic- itly coupling theoretical principles to applications in real-world situations. Such is the nature of all engineering, including those who choose to shape the building of the social world.

RITUALIZED THEORY AND METHODS: THE GREAT TEDIUM

As I indicated above, there is nothing wrong with teaching theory and methods to graduate students, or undergraduates for that matter. These activities are, after all, the core of any discipline. Thus, the issue is not that we teach these subjects, but how we do so. Let me begin with methodology.

Quantitative Methodology Down Students' Throats

Most graduate programs force students to learn quantitative methodology, a valuable and useful set of skills which any competent sociologist should possess. Perhaps experimental methods will also be taught, but it would be rare for a corre- sponding amount of ethnographic and historical methods to be included in the curriculum. This distribution of emphasis is rather amazing when one looks at the matter more closely. Think about the great discoveries in sociology, about the really important works, about the works that have stood the test of time, or about anything that is significant in sociology; and then ask yourself this question: How much of this work comes from quantitative survey methods? Not much, I would guess. Some very important knowledge has come from the application of experi- mental methodologies, but even more has come from historical, ethnographic, and other "soft" methods. This is not to conclude, however, that quantitative methods do not have their place, and they certainly do in experimental designs. But my point is that the most frequently taught and used method-survey research-is the least important in the cumulation of knowledge because surveys are, by their nature, mostly descriptive and, hence, time-bound. Often they are rather atheoret- ical and, thereby, not as interesting as theoretically-informed work.

Much more happens as students are forced to learn quantitative survey method- ologies, to the virtual exclusion of other modes of inquiry. They begin to believe that their success in the discipline comes from their ability to crank out numbers, using cookbook computer manuals that tell them how to do so. And this learning of how to be successful, in some rather drab way, becomes part of an indoctrina- tion ritual which, itself, is ritualized in that we must learn to do the latest statistical fad, almost in disregard as to its appropriateness to the problems at hand.

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Sociological Theory and Sociological Practice 245

Students must learn how to do these methods through instruction manuals that

tell us how to get data through the computer, at any cost.

Students are also told in an ideal world that methods are used to collect data to

test hypotheses derived from theory. Yet, we are infrequently given much instruc-

tion in how to connect the two; and when in the 1970s there was a renewed

concern with connecting theory and research, students were taught "theory

construction." The spate of books on "building theory" looked very much like

instructions to an erector set and resembled our pre-programed computer manu-

als (e.g., Dubin 1968: Reynolds 1971; Wallace 1971; Blalock 1969; Mullins 1971; Cohen 1980; Zetterberg 1963; Hage 1972). We heard back in the 1970s, and still today, loftly-sounding phrases about relating theory and methods, but we rarely

learned that theory is supposed to be about the real world and that it is designed to be tested with a wide variety of research methodologies.1

As a consequence, most sociologists come to define their professional compe- tence in terms of empirical research, per se, although we may cite a little theory at the beginning and end of articles as part of the research article ritual. But what we

really internalized from our graduate instruction is that success goes to those who can crunch the numbers, and if we have any of our earlier undergraduate ideals left, we come to believe that survey research on some problematic issue will be our contribution.

The Irrelevance of Theory To Anything: A Students' Guide

If our methodological training is flawed, because it is so narrowly ritualized, theory training is even worse. Theory, in most graduate schools in America, is taught as a genre as opposed to an explanation of anything. Students first learn the classics, and these are read as ends in themselves, as sacred texts to be worshipped as totems symbolizing the greatness of St. Marx, St. Weber, St. Durkheim and perhaps a few other canonized figures in sociology's pantheon. But strangely, students do not learn much about the models and principles that inhere in these classics and how these were developed to explain the real world.

In contemporary theory, students also learn this as a genre more than as an

explanation of real social forces. And, compared to the consensus over what is a classic, little consensus on importance of contemporary theories can be found. Students simply learn "schools of thought" as an end in themselves rather than as ideas that seek to explain how the world actually operates. It is considered almost laughable, and certainly philosophically naive, to propose the simple notion that, as a system of models and propositions, theory is intended to explain the operation of the fundamental dynamics of the social universe.

As a consequence, theory has become rather philosophical, engaging in hero worship of the masters and classics, mounting epistemological critiques about the failures of science, informing us all that explanations are always loaded with ideology, telling us again and again that explanations in terms of abstract laws and

models are impossible. For most students, then, theory becomes something to "get through" on their way to being certified number crunchers; and the few who remain in theory are primarily interested in philosophy, criticism, and debunking.

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246 SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES Volume 41, Number 2,1998

Sure, I have overstated the case, but there is a heavy element of truth in what I

have said-if one only looks honestly and frankly at what goes on in the profes- sional training of graduate students. In the end, this ritualized instruction in

theory and methods, and the separation of the two when collecting data or when

formulating theories, create what I will term as lack of "mental discipline" in soci-

ology. Our theories are undisciplined by empirical research, internal logic, or util-

ity in making the world better. Our methodologies are used to describe some

aspect of the empirical world in a theoretical vacuum. Our theorizing goes off into

the philosophical clouds, becoming ever more about itself as a genre and leaving

those who might want to test theories or to use them to change some problematic

situation with little but vague pronouncement by philosopher kings and ideo-

logues. Our research activities go in the direction of collecting data, any data, to

run through the computer so that "findings" can be reported in some journal, any journal.

This ritualized and unproductive way of engaging in theorizing and research is what makes sociology seem, to be frank, so "trivial" to some people in the real world, to say nothing of our academic colleagues. This prejudice against sociology is, I think, well deserved in many cases, but it is also a great tragedy since the world needs a science of human organization to help solve the many organiza- tional problems confronting the human species (and indirectly, virtually all other species).

And, to follow up on this last point and highlight the theme of this paper, the

ritualized instruction of theory and research, along with the lack of any real effort to connect the two, pushes "sociological practice" to the margins of the discipline. It does so in several senses: Sociological practices is low prestige work, at least

within the profession; correspondingly it is low pay work; it is almost always athe- oretical, often substituting the researchers' political or personal ideology for theory and, thereby, contributing nothing to theory and probably not improving very much the lot of humans (e.g., Lee, 1976); it tends to be performed outside of academia, hence partitioning researchers in sociological practice from each other and the discipline as a whole; it is often seen as illegitimate since psychology controls2 a good many of the important mechanisms for certifying competence (whether they really do certify competence is irrelevant to the point) and, as a result, bestowing formal legitimacy on practice. Thus, whatever we choose to call it-applied sociology,3 clinical sociology,4 or sociological practice5-the branch of sociology that tries to deal with the real world and harness what remains of our students' and professionals' early impulses to help others becomes an eclectic mix of program evaluation, social impact research, needs assessment, and mediation in concrete areas like criminal justice, health care delivery, family, and community organization. Sociological practice thus draws increasingly upon the cookbook methodologies to gather data, and as it does so, it further institutionalizes the over-emphasis on certain types of quantitative methods in our training of students, and it further separates research on real-life problems from theorists who long ago retreated into the philosophical clouds or mounted some ideological pulpit to vent their emotions.

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Sociological Theory and Sociological Practice 247

TOWARD A SOCIOLOGICAL ENGINEERING:

WHY DOES THIS SEEM SO OUTRAGEOUS?

The retreat of theory into the realm of philosophy or moralistic preaching is a great tragedy, and a double tragedy to the degree that this retreat separates sociological research from the discipline's explanatory efforts. The disconnection of theory and research has a number of very significant consequences: First, the separation of theoretically-informed research from our efforts at practice prevents sociology from gaining the respect and voice that should be ours. Almost every major prob- lem confronting the world revolves around social organization; and since sociol- ogy is the science of social organization, or should be, the very discipline devoted to study organizational problems is rarely invited to the policy-makers' table. The

work goes to economists, who have an elegant but simplistic theory; or it goes to psychologists who have some theories but more importantly who have the clout that comes from their control of much of the credentialing turf. Neither of these

disciplines has a real grasp of culture and social organization; yet, they dominate

because sociologists cannot produce formal theories, cannot connect these theories to research, and cannot refrain from ideological preaching when doing sociologi- cal practice. Perhaps this kind of marginality makes everyone happy, or morally pure, but it only assures our impotence to do very much about the problems of the world.

Secondly, the disconnection among theory, methods, and practice keeps sociol- ogy from being a cumulative science. Indeed, most sociologists probably do not even believe that sociology should be a science which, in a world dominated by this belief, only marginalizes us further or pushes us into the humanities where we must compete with far better-established disciplines. But most significantly, if sociology cannot be a cumulative science, it cannot have any real influence on the world. Disciplines able to "make a difference" have theories that have been tested and used on real-life problems. In a word, they have engineering applications; and many of their practitioners see themselves as engineers. Moreover, a discipline with engineering applications can be even more cumulative, because these appli- cations test the utility of theories, often forcing corrections and adjustments to the theories. A discipline like sociology that separates its theories from engineering applications loses one of its great sources of knowledge production. Instead, much sociological practice simply describes some phenomenon, and if there are more abstract pronouncements involved in this research, they are typically self-confirm- ing ideologies which are unlikely to be changed by research findings.

Thirdly, the disconnection of theory, methods, and practice reduces much empirical work in the discipline to survey research for essentially demographic, census taking, and other more descriptive tasks. Descriptive statistics are impor- tant, of course; they are needed for all kinds of reasons. But this emphasis on survey research takes sociological practice away from more qualitative methods that might be far more useful in understanding a problem, and it takes all research away from theories. Indeed, survey research is probably the least useful method- ology for testing theories, because it cannot capture real behavior (only what people say about behavior), because it cannot analyze structure (only indices of

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248 SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES Volume 41, Number 2, 1998

aggregated responses that are used as proxies of structure), because it cannot analyze history and process (except by cross-sections that hide intervening causal processes), and because it simply cannot get at the phenomena in a way compati-

ble with the way that theories are formulated. Again, sometimes it is not only useful but essential to have count of numbers, attitudes, feelings, socio-economic positions, and the like; but these cannot be a substitute for research and theory that examine structure, process, context, and other dynamic forces that are not easily transferred to correlation coefficients.

My big point in making this critique-true, somewhat overdrawn and polemi- cal-is that the theory-methods split keeps those in sociological practice from developing an "engineering mentality." And if those in sociological practice do not have such a mentality, and indeed if they resent such a label, then the disci- pline as a whole will not see itself as capable of social engineering. Before one dismisses what I am advocating, let me review what engineering really is.

At its core, engineering is the use of theoretical principles, often broken down into "rules of thumb," about how to build structures and to evaluate problems of structures. Despite their reputation as dreary and insensitive, engineers are actu- ally builders of things. They draw up plans; they weigh costs; they help formulate plans about how to proceed; they point out potential problems; and so on.

Why would sociologists-who started out dreaming to build a better world- shrink and run from the label, "social engineer?" One answer is that "social engi- neering" connotes an Orwellian image of "Big Brother," although most ideological sociologists that I know on both the left and right would be quite willing to be a Big Brother to us all in the name of their moral cause. Indeed, most ideological sociologists are closet engineers without the knowledge or mental discipline to build anything, even if they really wanted to leave the cloistered ivory tower in which they work. Another reason that we shrink from the label "social engineer" is that you have to be committed to developing theoretical principles, translating these on the basis of tests and experience into usable rules of thumb, and then using them to build something. When phrased in this manner, sociologists should become immediately embarrassed because we have no accepted principles6 to translate into rules of thumb that might suggest a project and plan incompatible with our ideologies. Still another reason that sociologists do not like the term "engineering" is that a discipline built around engineering applications would constrain sociologists from "doing their own thing." It would force them to disci- pline their thought and actions in terms of principles and applications; and it would encourage them to separate their personal and political ideologies from their work. Sociologists are most reluctant to do so because, despite their often pious preaching of collectivistic ideologies, sociologists are generally a bunch of "rugged individualists" who want to do their thing, in their own way, uncon- strained by facts, principles, or rules of thumb.

This unwillingness to impose mental discipline upon ourselves is perhaps why we use the label "sociological practice." The label does not smack of rigor, and in fact, it confuses the issue of whether we are clinicians engaged in the "healing arts" or something less soft but still as ill-defined. The label also is so vague and inclusive that anyone can belong; no one has to have credentials "to practice" as

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Sociological Theory and Sociological Practice 249

do engineers, doctors, and even psychologists. The label also allows the American Sociological Association to recruit otherwise marginal sociologists into its big dues-paying tent. And the label absolutely prevents sociologists from thinking of themselves as having the obligation to acquire a standard body of knowledge, to learn the general theoretical principles explaining the operation of society, to learn the ways that they can be applied to specific problems, and to use these principles to build something that, if they are wrong, will fall down.

But, to the extent sociologists still want to build a better world, they had better begin to think of themselves as social engineers. If we are to give advice and to be listened to, we must gain the respect that comes from having codified knowledge. The advice of a discipline will not be heeded without coherent theories, verified research findings, and past success at building something that did not fall down. The example of economists is revealing on this score, because it shows the power of having a theory-even a wrong one-organizing all intellectual activity. Economics in America has a wrong theory, or at least a very limiting one; and yet, they dominate policy decisions that should be ours. How can this be so? Part of the reason is that their theory supports the ideology of capitalist society, but more is involved: they come across as coherent, as confident, as able to use theories and rules of thumb to make predictions (however wrong), and to say how to do some- thing. Can sociology do the same? The answer is embarrassingly obvious: we cannot, except when we preach ideology to which no one with real power or with resources is going to pay much attention.

All powerful sciences have engineering applications. Moreover, these applica- tions often become great testing grounds; and they demonstrate the usefulness of a discipline's core knowledge. If sociologists refuse to even think like engineers, we will never have power, never exert much influence on the important problems of the day, and never amount to much of anything outside of academia (where we are often on shaky ground, as it is). When we refuse to call ourselves engineers in applied work, we weaken ourselves, lose respect, and come across as uncreden- tialed amateurs. We fail to live up to our calling as undergraduates, all those years ago before we went to graduate school and endured the numbing rituals of train- ing in theory and research. We destroy the potential of the discipline, subordinat- ing it to careerism, ideological preachings, and marginalization of our practitioners who cannot or will not see themselves as engineers and who must work without the legitimating umbrella of credentials and, if having them, the credentials provided by psychologists and other non-sociological credentialing bodies.

In 1984, the council of the American Sociological Association once again sought to explore the credentialing of sociologists, but in 1995 the effort was abandoned. It was abandoned, I think, because ASA had what it wanted: dues-paying members to the section on sociological practice. But more was involved: what could ASA really do to make certification possible? The terrain had already been plowed by psychology and other organizations that certify planning, counseling, and organizational management activities. It was, in essence, too late. Yet, two groups continue the effort to certify sociologists: (1) The Sociological Practice Association (SPA), formerly titled the Clinical Sociology Association; and (2) The

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250 SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES Volume 41, Number 2, 1998

American Academy of Professional Sociological Practitioners. Currently, there is a third effort involving a "commission" composed of representatives from the SPA and the Society for Applied Sociology.

In a recent e-mail exchange on the issues involved in these efforts, Michael Fleis-

cer makes the strong case for "in-house" credentialing at the state and local levels: "… Our faltering stature in academe-evidenced by department closures, mergers, and faculty line reductions-" and the perception of our "inefficacy in practice fields" should make us ready to reorganize sociological practice around creden- tials that have utility and meaning. Without such efforts, administrators are more likely to support academic departments whose "accredited programs successfully place their graduates into careers in academe, government, business, and indus- try." Yet, is it not too late for such efforts? Off the e-mail comes William T. White who notes that "except for counseling, I am aware of no demonstrated need for expertise possessed only by sociologists or by training inherent in sociology. Even counseling is dicey because most sociologists are not trained in psychotherapy, and I am curious as to how meaningful such certification would eventually improve….So what does sociology offer that warrants certification?" White's answer is revealing: "With no application base, there is no good way of testing theory and research and weeding out the nonsense."

How, then, do we weed out the nonsense when we cannot easily crack the appli- cation base? My answer is that we change tactics; rather than being clinicians and practitioners, let us be engineers. There is an important difference here, because engineering is more theoretically-informed and rigorous than much practice. And so, let us develop rigorous academic criteria for producing social engineers, because the battle over the credentialing turf is lost. Even the co-optive ASA admits it; so should the rest of us. Moreover, if we wish to gain respect within and outside of academia, we must become more rigorous, more disciplined. An engi- neering mentality takes us in the right direction.

DID THE MARGINALIZATION OF

SOCIOLOGICAL PRACTICE HAVE TO BE?

The early founders of sociology all had a vision of using sociology. Comte wanted to use the label "social physics" to emphasize the idea that sociology was to study the nature of social phenomena and to develop laws like those in physics. He was forced to settle on the Latin-Greek hybrid, sociology, because the Belgian statisti- cian, Quetelet, had already usurped the term for statistics-which represents a certain irony in light of sociology's over-reliance on statistics. But Comte also wanted sociology to be used for making a better world, in terms of some value premise. Other founding sociologists all had a vision of using sociology to change the world. Similarly, the founding figures of American sociology also wanted to use sociology for amelioration.

Except for Lester Frank Ward, none of America's founding sociologists was trained as a scientist. Yet, there was a kind of superficial commitment to sociology as a general science, but the early founders also conceived of sociology as a disci- pline committed to reformist goals and practical applications of knowledge

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