I’m representing Gabon, and I have attached my country position and some other countries positions such as France and US -there are two examples too- ?see CW1 fillCritical_Refle

Critical Reflection:

UNSC Simulation for Fragile States

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) simulation that took place on the 19th

of March 2021 was an informative and powerful opportunity to better understand the

functioning of such events in the United Nations. The participants of this module split into

groups by various countries; of which some were permanent and others non permanent

members of the security council to discuss the topic of fragile states. The countries presented

position papers beforehand, and throughout the simulation we discussed various resolutions

and amendments required to pass the resolution. This opened up the space for practicing

negotiations and diplomacy with fellow security council countries. Furthermore, the language

used throughout the simulation was extremely formal and similar to what would be expected

in the real council. All had to address each other diplomatically and respectfully; for example,

using phrases such as “fellow delegates”, “thank you chair”, and “India to respond to

Tunisia”. Although the online format of this event may not have turned out as perfectly as it

could in person; the formal language and structured timetable truly added to the real

experience of the simulation.

My group represented Norway's position on fragile states. Norway is not a part of the

P5, or permanent member states of the security council, however the country is noticeably an

influential actor (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2020). Our position paper outlined various

previous efforts made in aiding fragile states in all regions; therefore, we detailed our

involvement in Syria, Somalia, Israel/Palestine conflict, and general goals in fragile states.

The most fundamental stances we aligned with were open-communication, financial aid,

expanded education programmes, creating economic opportunities and overall providing aid

where needed. These policy recommendations reflect the research our group did to better

understand what efforts Norway has already made.

The negotiation theory we decided would work best was an integrative approach;

from the research conducted as a group we believed this truly represented Norway's attitude

in similar situations. Integrative negotiation theory, also known as ‘win-win’ negotiation, is

the practice of being honest and open about the interests of all parties involved (Staff, 2020).

This form of negotiation reflects Norway's open communication and flexible nature. In fact,

we used this method to negotiate with the United Kingdom in the unmoderated caucus; we

proposed to form a mutually beneficial relationship between Norway and the UK to support

our amendments and resolutions towards reducing defence funding. I felt as though the

unmoderated caucus was truly the best environment for negotiations to take place; it allowed

for us to reach a ZOPA or if needed a BATNA. ZOPA, or zone of possible agreement, is the

place where two parties are able to find common ground in terms of resolutions or

agreements (Merino, 2017). Unfortunately, our efforts in persuading the United Kingdom to

align with our views was not successful; however, this indicated one of the issues with

integrative negotiations is that not all negotiations reflect ZOPA’s but rather the need for a

BATNA. A BATNA is the best alternative to a negotiated agreement; and Norway therefore

proceeded to support the resolutions which aligned with our own similar goals.

During the UNSC simulation, we found that we aligned most with Tunisia's proposals

and goals in fragile states. In their position paper they outlined policies including promoting

peace and security in fragile states, implementing stronger cooperation and issues of mass

migration. The resolution proposed by Tunisia in the simulation highlighted reconsidering the

Palestine and Israel conflict and increasing financial support to fragile states. They also

proposed fully implementing S/RES/2334 and resolution A/73/255 in proposing the

formation of a Palestine State. From our research, as a group we knew that Norway had

already created a diplomatic mission in Tunisia by placing an embassy there recently; this

furthered our intrigue in creating relations. We found a ZOPA with Tunisia, due to similar

positions Norway has on the Israel/Palestine conflict; Norway supports the stance of

increased intervention and funding for this area and to promote peace and security within the

region. Although, we argued that Norway would not be able to fully accept all proposals

outlined, we believe that ZOPA would be useful here if certain amendments were made to the

resolution. For example, in section 5, among others, of the Tunisia proposal we fully agree

with the demand of increased financial aid and further support to Palestinian refugees.

However, the United States of America, as a permanent member, exercised its right to

veto the vote. The veto power, held only by P5, fully declines the proposal even if a majority

of countries on the security council motion to vote in favor (Security Council Report, 2015).

This response by the US, demonstrated an important limitation to the security council. The P5

may have too much power, and can simply veto any proposals or resolutions that do not favor

their own proposals. As the US has often shown to fully support Israel, this explained

possible reasoning as to why the veto was enacted. This also demonstrated how quickly a

vote can be dismissed when contradicted by permanent members. In terms of relations with

the US, we initially believed that Norway would be able to find common values and goals.

However, after reading the US position paper we found that their focus was mainly on

Afghanistan and not indicative on their stance in other regions. In a policy recommendation

the US asserts that they are open to communication with the Taliban. However, as Chatham

House claims it is unusual for democrative governments to do so (Chatham House 2019). As

Norway we agreed to no-negotiations with terrorists, therefore we voted against the US

proposal.

The US approach was a structural approach, which can also be seen as a win-lose

strategy. A structural approach can be understood as “explanations of outcomes in patterns of

relationships between parties or their goals” (Alfredson, 2008). This was seen in the UNSC

simulation when their proposal was voted against in the first caucus; to regain their power

they therefore vetoed Tunisia's proposal. The US role in the simulation offered a possible

negative outcome to structural negotiation theory; as the win-lose aspect of the negotiation

offers in some times little options for BATNA. The simulation also reflected how the US was

misrepresented in many negotiations and resolutions; as a group we believed if the focus was

less on Afghanistan, Norway likely would have found a ZOPA with the United States of

America. However, a BATNA was achievable between the US and Norway, with

amendments to some resolutions. The issue was that the lack of time, brief negotiation in the

unmoderated caucus and unclear position of the US we did not effectively negotiate with

them. Furthermore, as mentioned above when the US vetoed Tunisia's proposal it outlined a

possible unfair power dynamic between smaller states and larger ones. The proposal Tunisia

presented was one that many countries would have agreed upon; however the power dynamic

shows that powerful countries can often simply stop it without giving reasoning.

Towards the end of the UNSC simulation, the countries finally came to an agreed

upon resolution that suited most countries' recommendations. The final resolutions outlined

the need for further documentation of conflicts in the world, specifically in fragile states.

Secondly, the UNSC would need to create various subcommittees to assume responsibilities

of each conflict in fragile states. It was also proposed that all states in the UN should increase

funding in peacekeeping missions, financial aid, and humanitarian crises. Finally, to end

violence in Myanmar as a responsibility by all members of the security council. These

resolutions align with our position, Norway has always been eager to fund and provide

peacekeeping missions as outlined by our proposal. Therefore our team saw this as a success

for Norway, as many of our own policy recommendations were fulfilled through the final

resolution. An issue with this simulation was that not all countries uploaded their position

papers with enough time for our group to debate what our strategies of negotiation would be.

More time to read through the papers may have given us a better understanding of who to

negotiate with and which techniques to use. The moderated caucus ran smoothly except for a

few informal interjections by groups, which were quickly corrected. The unmoderated caucus

was an opportune time to practice how to negotiate; our group believed that with more time

we could have had increased success with countries such as the United Kingdom, the United

States of America, and India. The research part beforehand provided the opportunity to

analytically understand what a country, such as Norway, would propose or recommend when

looking at fragile states. Moreover, it also allowed for the interpretation of which negotiation

theory would work best and then how to further use that theory to create diplomatic relations

with other countries. This experience was an informative and engaging method of learning

more about the procedures and theories of negotiation needed in the UN.

References

Alfredson, T. (2008). “Negotiation Theory and Practice.” Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Available at: http://www.fao.org/docs/up/easypol/550/4-5_negotiation_background_paper_179en.pdf [Accessed 24 March 2021].

Chatham House. (2019). “Negotiating with Terrorists.” Chatham House. Available at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/events/all/members-event/negotiating-terrorists [Accessed 25 March 2021].

Merino, M. (2017). “Understanding the Zone of Possible Agreement.” Harvard Business School Online. Available at: https://online.hbs.edu/blog/post/understanding-zopa [Accessed 25 March 2021]

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2020). “Norway in the UN Security Council.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available at: https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/the-un/norway_unsc/id2603889/ [Accessed 23 March 2021].

Security Council Report. (2015). “The Veto.” Security Council Report. Available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/the-veto.php [Accessed 25 March 2021].

Staff, P. (2020). “Use Integrative Negotiation Strategies to Create Value at the Bargaining Table.” Harvard Law School. Available at: https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/negotiation-skills-daily/find-more-value-at-the-bargaining -table/ [Accessed 25 March 2021].

Individual Critical Reflection – France

The already concerning situation of fragile states worldwide has been further escalated due

to the multifaceted issues brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic. With just under one

hundred and twenty five million confirmed cases and two and a half million deaths globally

(World Health Organization, 2021), it is estimated that one-third of these cases and fatalities

are located in highly vulnerable countries faced with refugee and humanitarian crises

(Security Council, 2020). Fragile states have lacked resources and support during the

pandemic, generating potential long-term social, economic and political consequences.

Countries in such positions have witnessed an increase in poverty, hunger, human rights

violations, risking a decline of institutional order in newly established democratic

governments. Furthermore, vaccination programs and campaigns have been disrupted,

‘putting more than 80 million children under the age of one at risk of vaccine-preventable

diseases’ (Security Council, 2020). With this, the Security Council (SC) has, since March

2020, been working to address the concerns surrounding maintaining peace and security in

fragile states during such unprecedented times. This paper will critically analyse the

conflicting position points and negotiation tactics of the delegation of the United States,

Vietnam and India during the simulation and will further evaluate the virtual experience of the

debate as a whole.

As a representative of the delegation of France, our aim was to push delegates to commit to

the upkeep of newly-formed democracies in this time of global health crisis by calling for

further humanitarian aid support and monetary contributions towards the Global

Humanitarian Response Plan. Our position focused on the fragile status of African states

during this time, most specifically the Central African Republic (CAR) and the Republic of

Mali, countries which share intrinsic economic, political and historical ties with France.

France’s diplomatic posture throughout the debate, and further emphasised in our position

paper, was that of a comprehensive collaborative approach of international partnership

which prioritised the facilitation of peacekeeping operations by enabling them to fully

implement their mandates, despite the challenges incurred by the pandemic. Ultimately,

France’s main goal was to preserve democracy by finding a resolution that would protect

decades worth of political and economic development investment in fragile states, now at

risk of deterioration due to the pandemic.

While France greatly welcomed the grand majority of position papers presented by the

participating members of the SC, where most declared their underlying support to deal with

the challenges presented by the COVID-19 pandemic as a matter of urgency, the debate

itself steered in a completely different direction. In a proposal put forward by the delegation

of India, the council surprisingly voted to focus the discussions solely on conflict resolution.

While France was also committed to finding a resolution related to the cessation of hostilities

and conflict, we found this topic to be not only incredibly broad for a moderated caucus but it

also conflicted with the majority of position papers and our debate expectations.

Furthermore, resolution 2532, which calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities and

armed conflicts during this moment, passed unanimously by the SC in July 2020 (United

Nations Security Council, 2020), making our discussion on conflict resolution redundant.

Although France attempted to exercise its veto power to negate the passing of this motion,

this was unfortunately overseen by the chair and the motion passed with a simple majority.

The delegation of France believed that the SC would have benefited from taking a

consequentialist approach and focusing on finding a resolution to the immediate, unresolved

matters related to the challenges on fragile states before attempting to resolve their

pre-pandemic conflicts. For example, the protection of aid workers and medical personnel in

fragile states, which France strongly advocated for, will impede the discontinuation of efforts

on poverty eradication, education, healthcare and development.

Although France and the US are well-known diplomatic partners, our approaches during this

debate were extensively different. The US holds significant relevance and power within the

decision-making body and processes of the SC. However, on this occasion, the American

position paper was incompatible with the real-life postures of US foreign policy on priorities

and measures to support peace and security in fragile states. While the new Biden-Harris

administration is currently negotiating cuts for their defence spending, which was increased

by 19% during the Trump administration (Stone, 2020), the delegation of the US took a

unilateral approach and proposed an increase of defence budgets and spending by the

member states of the SC, which would be used to support military interventions. While this

may have been an accurate posture for the US delegation to hold in a 2001 post-9/11

themed SC simulation, it did not align with the new administration’s foreign policy strategy

and with the aims of the debate overall. Furthermore, for unexplained reasons, the

delegation of the US focused their position paper solely on their bilateral relationship with the

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. For a simulation of an institution that highly promotes

multilateral diplomatic practice, this decision was rather disappointing. It limited debating

capacities with the US and disrupted the group’s negotiation dynamics as a whole. Having

known the American position before the submission of the position papers, our delegation

would have pushed for a Franco-American political and economic collaboration of aid and

peacekeeping in Afghanistan. Furthermore, France, together with the other P5 member

states could have pushed the US to steer its focus of the debate toward COVID related

emergencies in fragile states.

When evaluating the theoretical basis of negotiation for some of the most involved actors of

the discussion, while the delegation of India took the lead in attempting to find a possible

zone of agreement between the SC (Merino, 2017), France and other P5 member states

rejected their proposal for states to decrease their defence budget and spending by 7.5%.

India’s integrative bargaining tactic (Weingart et al, 1987) failed to estimate the almost

obvious constraints posed by the power and influence of the P5 and their unwillingness to

allow their national policies and spending to be a matter of negotiation for the SC. On the

other hand, France was poised as a competitive negotiator committed to using its bargaining

power (O’Neill, 2018) to guarantee the inclusion of its interest in the final resolution.

‘Competitive negotiators attempt to conceal the true extent of their authority to make

compromises (…) they seek to persuade rather than discuss’ (Lowenthal, 1982).

Furthermore, while the simulation called for a systematic collaborative and multilateral

approach for a topic that raises transnational concerns, the delegations of the US and

Vietnam focused their attention on issues concerning their own national security, foreign

policies and relations. As previously mentioned, while the US focused its position solely on

solidifying its relationship with Afghanistan, Vietnam disregarded the committee topic as a

whole and proposed another, no less concerning, discussion on China’s assertive and

expansionist behaviour in the East Sea region. However, this matter was already tabled for

debate in the ASEAN 2020 summit where its leaders recalled and reiterated the UN’s

Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) to find a resolution for this dispute based on

‘sovereignty rights and entitlements’ (The Guardian, 2020). While the UK and France both

believe that China is a ‘clear and present threat to the stability of the region and the

international community’ (Meizels, 2019), this specific discussion did not fit with the purpose

of the debate.

Model United Nations (MUN) simulations are a key tool for learning IR theory and ‘doing

politics’ (Haack, 2008; 395; Asal, 2005). It presents the importance of group work and

cooperation, serving as a site of ‘collective legitimization’ where state representatives come

together to seek ‘multilateral endorsement of their positions’ (Claude Jr, 1986). As Professor

R. P. Barston (1997) explained, diplomacy is ‘an attempt to explore and reconcile conflicting

positions in order to reach an acceptable outcome’ (p.84) . All and all, the experience of

running this simulation online mimicked the real-life adaptations of global governance in this

period of isolation and social distancing. Such conditions have established a growing

demand for digital competence as a vital skill for future diplomats. Diplomacy, as we have

seen, is a site subject to constant change (Barston, 1997: 4). However, ‘traditional

diplomacy is unlikely to be abandoned’ (Purwasito and Kartinawati, 2020). As much as the

virtual simulations attempt to come close to the experiences of in-person debates, it differs

greatly due to the fact that we are unable to detect, absorb and incorporate other important

factors of negotiation, such as body language, more fluid, direct and informal negotiations

during unmoderated caucuses, and varying cultural forms of communication. Either way, it is

a highly-valuable mode of learning, a must-have experience for any student of International

Relations.

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