Respond to at least two posts of your classmates, with at least one cited source each and a minimum of 150 words per response in APA format. Show points on why. I have attached both peer post and the required reading where the information was taken from.
Required reading:
ATP 4-93, Sustainment Brigade, April 2016, pp. 1-1 to 1-17 (17 pages)
FM 1-01, Generating Force Support for Operations. Appendix A-1 to A-13. FM 1-01, Generating Force Support for Operations. Appendix A-1 to A-13.
U.S Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) provides air, land and sea transportation for the Department of Defense. U.S. Transportation command is a critical aspect in the National Security Starageidy as it facilitates the mobility of all military equipment across all COCOMS (Department of Defense, 2017). The main missions of TRANSCOM include air, sea land transportation, management of global patient movement, management of DTS, joint sourcing of contracted mobility assets and more. USTRANSCOM, in short, moves the force and enables the global reach that is critical to the Department of Defense.
Defense Support of Civil Authorities or DSCA is a collaboration of efforts that often include DOD civilians, contractors and all components of the DOD to support local municipalities in incidents such as domestic responsibilities, law enforcement support and other domestic actions (Department of Defense, 2017). DSCA, while simplistic in concept bridges multiple authorities and involves a complicated command structure involving civilian leadership. The complicated nature of civilian-military interaction coupled with a non-standard command structure lends DSCS mission to be challenging in nature.
There are several challenges that the U.S. Transportation Command may face when supporting a DSCA mission. DSCA missions are typically short notice. TRANSCOM must react quickly to fulfill the mobilization requirements in a timely manner. Additionally, during reception, staging, onward-movement and integration (RSOI) U.S. Transportation Command’s subordinate elements must be able to rapidly flex to the ever-changing environment that is often present in DSCA missions. Examples are the moving equipment as the need arises due to the operational environment in a natural disaster or civil disturbance. Funding for U.S. Transportation Command is also complicated during Defense Support of Civil Authority missions. Because funding crossed titles of authority (Department of Defense, 2017) it can be difficult to move in the rapid manner. There are systems such as a Declaration of Emergency that local municipalities can utilize to help expedite funding but it is never as easy as what is viewed as a “tradition” mission. Lastly, required logistical support is often difficult as well due to the nature of DSCA missions.
While there are challenges faced by TRANSCOM during the RSOI phase of operations in a DSCA mission a well-educated staff aided by a SGM can leverage the required assets to ensure the mission is accomplished.
References
Department of Defense. (2017). The Defense Transportation System (JP 4-01). https://sgm-a.blackboard.com/bbcswebdav/courses/SGM-A_SMC_DL_AY21-22_PH2_MASTER/jp4_01_2%20Sealift.pdf
Department of Defense. (2017) Joint Operations (JP 3-0). https://sgm-a.blackboard.com/bbcswebdav/courses/SGM-A_SMC_DL_AY21-22_PH2_MASTER/JP%203-0.pdf
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United States Transport Command Challenges
Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI) is an involved process responsible for interpreting Future Deployment Operations. Most nations could not stabilize and gain effective control over the process. The Military perceives RSOI as transforming the arrivals of individuals and equipment into forces that can effectively realize the operational requirements. This paper outlines the United States Transport Command (USTRANCOM) challenges during RSOI under the Defense Support of Civil Authorities. Furthermore, this paper provides possible solutions to avoiding the challenges. United States Transport Command has faced the challenge in Public Affairs, Securing the Airports, the Effectiveness of the Crew in management of Safety Airlifts, and the stability as far as absorbing the dangers of terrorism.
Contractor Management
Contractor management is a challenge that affects the RSOI process, and the United States Command needs to be sensitive to the effective implementation of a safety plan. Contractor movement involves integrating and overseeing the personnel and all the equipment associated with the process. The equipment applies to the personals and strictly dispenses the military operations. The movement in the contract involves planning, deployment, or redeployment, in theater management and protection of the force. Transport Command discharges the duty in compliance with the need to work with Defense Security Cooperation Agency and support the Civil Authority (Richelson, 2018). Integrating the three interrelated operational contracts in support of the functions is challenging for Transco.
Prevalence of potential threats to the safety and peace of the citizens in the United States calls for attention from the relevant authorities. Armed forces designed the Joint Operations Doctrine to serve the needs of the Citizens as far as the transit of goods, services, and people. The joint operations, founded on war-fighting philosophies and the experience-derived theory. USTRANSCOM's efforts need to lean on the principle of war and the fundamentals of joint warfare. The doctrine has prescribed functionalism and essentialism of the process in the Doctrine for the Army in the United States. They may associate the joint effort as the solution source with a revolutionary idea for going through the RSOI process. The practical implementation will translate to the shift in the effective rates in the RSOI process.
The capacity of the Joint Forces to work cohesively is a key to an operational environment. The threats are explicit within the limits of the land transport, but both air and sea lifts share the risk involved. Challenges in explanation execution planning, essential planning for the Cargo and related concepts, and protection through operations security accompany interference. In most incidences, the Automatic Planning Tools are. We should commit the United States Transport Command to employ Sealift, including support for communications. The acquisition vessel and the Activation process remain well defined through the mission statements and structure of Command for some of the sensitive activities (Isreal, 2019). The situation or the prevalent fact does not undermine the efforts of the United States Transport Command but highlights some areas where the body has not been yielding the best.
Proactive Prevention of the Challenge
Information is the best source of power, and the awareness of the shortcomings enables Transco to be on its toes in assuring safety throughout the RSOI process. The success of the proactive prevention approach to the challenge calls for the improvement of joint operations in Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration. For example, the Marine Transport, the Sealift transport structure, should exist in a four-process structure. First, the Transco should determine the cargo and sustainment requirements in the transit. The requirements need to exist in the Unit of Measure.
A preventive approach is the Best Course of action regarding security issues. Initial results may be good, but the process is corrupt, and in most incidences, the flawed process ruins the outcome. Transport Command should keep the Planning and Execution Systems updated. Relevant agencies need to cooperate in developing the infrastructure and supporting the development projects. The projects will yield the best through highlighting the relevance of addressing the support of the host nation during the time of peace. The endeavor should strive for established common words for the RSOI operations (Archambault, 2019). Theatre Level organizations for RSOI should also endure planning for the execution of the RSOI operations. Communication lines should thrive to ensure effective delivery of services. The joint operations are healthy in weighing the potential and predicting the capabilities of the United States Military.
References
Richelson, J. T. (2018). The US intelligence community. Routledge.
Isreal, E. M. (2019). Joint Reception Staging Onward Movement and Integration (JRSOI): The Commanders Role in Integration. US Army Command and General Staff College.
Archambault, M. (2019). Putting the Fight Back in the Staff. Military Review, 99.
Christie, G. A. (1967). Comparative histochemical studies on implantation and placentation. University of Glasgow (United Kingdom).
Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2018). Joint Operations (JP 3-0). Retrieved from
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_20180622.pdf
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FM 1-01
Generating Force Support for Operations
April 2008
Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Headquarters, Department of the Army
This publication is available at Army Knowledge Online (www.us.army.mil) and General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine
Digital Library at (www.train.army.mil).
FM 1-01
Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
i
Field Manual No. 1-01
Headquarters Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 2 April 2008
Generating Force Support for Operations
Contents Page
PREFACE ……………………………………………………………………………………………….iii INTRODUCTION ……………………………………………………………………………………….v Chapter 1 THE ARMY’S GENERATING FORCE……………………………………………………… 1-1
The Army ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 1-1 Effective Capabilities ……………………………………………………………………………… 1-5
Chapter 2 THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ……………………………………………………. 2-1 Significant Societal Trends ……………………………………………………………………… 2-1 Operational Variables …………………………………………………………………………….. 2-2 Threats ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 2-5 Full Spectrum Operations: The Army’s Operational Concept ………………………. 2-5 Unified Action ……………………………………………………………………………………….. 2-6 Joint Interdependence ……………………………………………………………………………. 2-7 ARFORGEN …………………………………………………………………………………………. 2-7
Chapter 3 EMPLOYING THE GENERATING FORCE ………………………………………………. 3-1 Categories of Support ……………………………………………………………………………. 3-1 Organization of Generating Force Capabilities ………………………………………….. 3-1 Supporting the Joint Campaign ……………………………………………………………….. 3-2 Planning Support for Operations ……………………………………………………………… 3-7 Providing Capabilities …………………………………………………………………………….. 3-8 Accessing Capabilities …………………………………………………………………………… 3-9
Chapter 4 ADAPTING TO THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT …………………………….. 4-1 Understanding the Operational Environment …………………………………………….. 4-1 Support to Rapid Adaptation …………………………………………………………………… 4-8 Generating Capabilities for Operations …………………………………………………… 4-11
Chapter 5 ENABLING STRATEGIC REACH …………………………………………………………… 5-1 Support to Force Projection…………………………………………………………………….. 5-1 Sustaining Deployed Forces …………………………………………………………………… 5-4 Building and Sustaining Operational Networks ………………………………………… 5-10
Contents
ii FM 1-01 2 April 2008
Chapter 6 DEVELOPING MULTINATIONAL PARTNER CAPABILITY AND CAPACITY 6-1 Stability Operations ………………………………………………………………………………… 6-1 Support for Security Force Assistance ……………………………………………………… 6-2 Support for Infrastructure Development……………………………………………………..6-6
Appendix ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR CAPABILITIES FOR OPERATIONAL SUPPORT……………………………………………………………………………………………. A-1
GLOSSARY ……………………………………………………………………………… Glossary-1 REFERENCES………………………………………………………………………. References-1 INDEX …………………………………………………………………………………………… Index-1
Figures
Figure 1-1. Title 10 functions ……………………………………………………………………………………. 1-2 Figure 1-2. Representative list of Army generating force organizations………………………….. 1-3 Figure 6-1. Representative force integration capabilities ……………………………………………… 6-5
2 April 2008 FM 1-01 iii
Preface
This manual defines the Army’s generating force and establishes as doctrine the employment of its capabilities in support of ongoing joint and multinational operations and deployed forces. It describes how operating forces can access and employ generating force capabilities in support of ongoing operations. It incorporates lessons learned from recent and ongoing operations, including Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, the War on Terrorism, the response to Hurricane Katrina, and others. This information allows operational Army forces to understand generating force capabilities and employ these capabilities successfully in support of ongoing operations. It enables generating force organizations to ready these capabilities. This manual describes how the joint force can access and employ generating force capabilities in support of operations.
The generating force consists of Army organizations whose primary mission is to generate and sustain the operational Army. The United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), for example, is part of the generating force. Activities the generating force conducts in support of readiness, Army force generation (ARFORGEN), and the routine performance of functions specified and implied in Title 10 and other applicable legislation are addressed in Army regulations and Department of the Army pamphlets and are not addressed here. As a consequence of its performance of functions specified and implied by law, the generating force also possesses operationally useful capabilities for employment by or in direct support of joint force commanders. This manual’s introduction elaborates the manual’s purpose and explains the necessity of employing generating force capabilities in the conduct of operations. It introduces the three principal categories of generating force support to ongoing operations: adapting to the operational environment, enabling strategic reach, and developing multinational partner capability and capacity.
• Chapter 1 defines the generating force and its relationship to the operational Army and the joint force. It describes the three categories of capabilities.
• Chapter 2 describes the operational environment and the role of landpower within it. It briefly describes where the generating force fits within the operational environment.
• Chapter 3 describes the employment of the generating force for ongoing operations. This includes how operating forces access generating force capabilities and the employment of those capabilities in a joint campaign.
• Chapter 4 describes how the generating force enables adaptation to the operational environment. It describes how generating force capabilities contribute to attaining situational understanding and adapting Army operational capabilities to a specific context.
• Chapter 5 describes how the generating force enables strategic reach. It describes the generating force’s role in projecting power and sustaining it once deployed. It describes the generating force’s role in developing and maintaining the network that connects Soldiers, policy makers, and support personnel. It concludes by describing the generating force’s role in supporting reconstruction.
• Chapter 6 discusses how the generating force supports the development of multinational partner capability and capacity through participation in security and reconstruction.
• The appendix lists the principal generating force organizations and their capabilities for supporting operations.
This manual applies to Army headquarters at the brigade echelon and above. It is of primary interest to the commanders and staffs of theater armies, corps, and divisions and the leaders of Army commands, direct reporting units, and Headquarters, Department of the Army. It applies to all Army leaders, especially planners, trainers, educators, force designers, materiel developers, and doctrine developers.
This manual applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.
Preface
iv FM 1-01 2 April 2008
TRADOC is the proponent for this manual. The U.S. Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) is the preparing agency. Send written comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Director, Army Capabilities Integration Center (Forward), Room 1200, 2530 Crystal Drive, Arlington, Virginia 22202. Send electronic comments to arcic.army.mil/fm101form.asp.
2 April 2008 FM 1-01 v
Introduction
The Army’s primary mission is to provide capabilities for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. The Army most effectively executes a particular mission when it draws on the collective capability of the entire force. The Army provides its capabilities from two functionally discrete but organizationally integrated entities known as the operational Army and the generating force. Most of the Army’s operational capability resides in the modular units and headquarters of the operational Army, which the generating force generates and sustains. Besides generating and sustaining the operational Army, the generating force can provide operational capabilities for employment by or in support of joint force commanders.
Today’s operational environment is complex, interconnected, and dynamic. It calls for the use of specific operational capabilities intrinsic to the generating force’s performance of functions specified and implied by law. This environment comprises the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the commander’s decisions. It includes physical areas and factors and the information domain. It also includes the adversary, friendly, and neutral systems relevant to a specific joint operation. Many U.S. enemies and adversaries are highly adaptive, often combining their ability to adapt with asymmetric tactics and capabilities. This operational environment demands increasingly sophisticated capabilities for rapid analysis of and rapid adaptation to the operational area, or for tailoring the operational force for a specific context.
Additionally, defeating adaptive enemies requires the establishment or restoration of stable states and effective institutions, especially security forces. The generating force’s ability to develop and sustain potent landpower capabilities supports security forces and governmental institutions. It also contributes to developing, maintaining, and managing infrastructure. Moreover, the modern information environment and improved transportation capabilities allow the effective application of capabilities from outside a combatant commander’s area of responsibility. Over the course of the War on Terrorism, generating force organizations have improvised and provided many capabilities in this vein.
This manual institutionalizes the generating force role in providing capabilities to operating forces. Generating force support to ongoing operations falls into three broad categories:
• Adapting to the operational environment is the ability to adapt U.S. capabilities, or generate new ones, to meet the requirements of a rapidly and constantly evolving operational environment.
• Enabling strategic reach is the contribution of the generating force to increasing the distance and duration over which the nation can project power.
• Developing multinational partner capability and capacity is the generating force’s support of stability operations by providing capabilities to assist security forces and conduct reconstruction.
Operating force commanders and planners use these three categories to guide their employment of generating force capabilities. Generating force leaders use these categories to guide in developing capabilities for operational employment.
This manual describes the major, existing capabilities of the generating force to support ongoing operations. Generating force leaders further consider the inherent operational capabilities of their organizations and adapt those capabilities in support of joint force commanders. This manual does not provide an exhaustive list of operationally relevant generating force capabilities.
As with any military mission, the formal processes by which capabilities are allocated, and the formal relationships under which they operate, are less important than the participants’ understanding of the shared mission and their will to accomplish it. The operational Army and the generating force must remain mutually aware of the Army’s collective capabilities and operational needs. They must work together to provide optimum capabilities to joint force commanders.
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2 April 2008 FM 1-01 1-1
Chapter 1
The Army’s Generating Force
The Army is divided into two functionally discrete but organizationally integrated entities. These are known as the operational Army and the generating force. The operational Army consists primarily of units whose primary purpose is to conduct or support full spectrum operations. The generating force is that part of the Army whose primary purpose is generating and sustaining operational Army units by performing functions specified and implied by law. As a consequence of performing those functions, the generating force also has capabilities that are useful in supporting operations in the current operational environment. This chapter defines and describes the Army’s generating force and its relationship to the operational Army.
THE ARMY 1-1. The Army derives its existence and mission from the Constitution of the United States and from legislation, principally Title 10 of the U.S. Code. FM 1 thoroughly describes the origins, organization, and mission of the Army. In brief, according to the U.S. Code, the Army’s primary mission is to provide capabilities to conduct prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. The Army is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war, except as otherwise assigned. In accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, it is also responsible for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war.
1-2. The Army calls these capabilities landpower. Landpower is the ability—by threat, force, or occupation—to promptly gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people (FM 3-0).
1-3. To provide landpower capabilities, the Army has two functionally discrete but organizationally integrated entities known as the operational Army and the generating force. The operational Army provides the bulk of Army capabilities to the joint force for the conduct of full spectrum operations. The generating force generates and sustains the operational Army and also provides some specific landpower capabilities to the joint force.
1-4. An Army organization’s primary purpose distinguishes it as part of the operational Army or the generating force. Regardless of their purpose or assignment of resources, Army organizations provide the capabilities that meet the operational need.
THE OPERATIONAL ARMY 1-5. The operational Army consists primarily of the Army Modular Force, which is trained and organized to fight as part of the joint force. Modular organizations can be quickly assembled into strategically responsive force packages able to move rapidly wherever needed. They can quickly and seamlessly transition among types of operations. Modular organizations provide the bulk of forces needed for sustained land operations. In addition to conventional forces, the Army continues to provide the majority of special operations force capabilities in support of the U.S. Special Operations Command’s global mission.
1-6. By law, operational Army units are typically assigned to combatant commanders. The Army normally executes its responsibilities to organize, train, and equip operational Army units through Army Service component commands (ASCCs).
1-7. This manual makes frequent reference to operating forces, defined as those forces whose primary missions are to participate in combat and the integral supporting elements thereof (JP 1-02). In this manual,
Chapter 1
1-2 FM 1-01 2 April 2008
the term operating forces broadly connotes joint capabilities employed in the conduct of full spectrum operations. The generating force supports operating forces from all services in the conduct of joint operations.
THE GENERATING FORCE 1-8. The primary mission of the generating force is to generate and sustain operational Army capabilities. This mission and the generating force’s capabilities to execute it are more fully described in the Army War College publication, How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook. The generating force also possesses operationally useful capabilities. However, the Army does not organize the generating force into standing organizations with a primary focus on specific operations. Rather, when generating force capabilities perform specific functions or missions in support of and at the direction of joint force commanders, it is for a limited period of time. Upon completion of the mission, the elements and assets of those generating force capabilities revert to their original function.
1-9. All elements of the Army, whether generating force or operational Army, perform functions specified by law (figure 1-1). The practical distinction is that the execution of these functions and others implied by law constitutes the primary purpose of generating force organizations. Title 10 is not the only statute that governs the generating force, nor is the list of functions in figure 1-1 exhaustive.
Figure 1-1. Title 10 functions
1-10. The current security environment has led to the emergence of certain operational missions requiring employment of generating force capabilities. Missions suitable for generating force capabilities include—
The development of multinational partners’ security forces. The repair, development, and management of infrastructure in support of stability operations. The adaptation of operating forces across the domains of doctrine, organization, training,
materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF).
The generating force often can perform these types of missions with greater effectiveness and efficiency than ad hoc operational Army organizations. Put another way, the generating force can perform its Title 10 functions either in generating and sustaining the operational Army or for supporting ongoing operations. However, in each case the generating force provides its capabilities under a different set of conditions. This manual describes the subsets of generating force capabilities to support ongoing operations.
1-11. The generating force includes Army commands and direct reporting units. Figure 1-2 lists representative organizations from the generating force. Unlike operational Army units, which are usually assigned to combatant commanders, organizations within the generating force typically are assigned to the Department of the Army and report to the Secretary of the Army.
The Army’s Generating Force
2 April 2008 FM 1-01 1-3
Figure 1-2. Representative list of Army generating force organizations
1-12. Oversight of generating forces’ training and readiness, especially to perform operational tasks, is the direct responsibility of Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA). The Army G-3/5/7 is the HQDA element with primary responsibility for the oversight of generating force capabilities to support operations.
1-13. The generating force lacks a standing reserve of uncommitted resources for specific operational support. As previously stated, the generating force’s primary mission—generating and sustaining the operational Army—determines its overall capabilities and capacity. Diverting generating force elements to participate in ongoing operations risks impairing the generating force’s capability to perform its primary mission. Generating force leaders mitigate that risk by mobilizing additional resources to backfill resources diverted to ongoing operations, but this takes time. For that reason, Army senior leadership carefully considers the effects of diverting generating force resources for employment in ongoing operations.
CATEGORIES OF SUPPORT FOR OPERATIONS 1-14. Generating force support for full spectrum operations falls into three broad categories:
Adapting to the operational environment. Enabling strategic reach. Developing multinational partner capability and capacity.
These categories describe the application of existing capabilities in today’s operational environment.
1-15. Operational planners refer to these categories when considering, requ